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I. INTRODUCTION
On most days, around the middle of the working day, I leave my office,
walk along a corridor, travel down some stairs, and exit the building in
which I work. Outside, I pass over a driveway that connects to a street.
From there, I proceed along a sidewalk next to a grassy boulevard. On
this strip of green, students often sit and discuss the morning’s lecture or
their plans for the afternoon. Sometimes I see homeless people sleeping
under a tree, their belongings spread out beside them. I walk to the
corner, cross the street, and continue down another street, past a church
where people may be entering for worship. Sometimes a person standing in
front of the church speaks about Christianity and offers me a leaflet,
proclaiming that it is not too late for me to be saved. I walk on, past
various shops and restaurants, and turn into a pedestrian mall. The mall
is often crowded with people, and very often I am approached and asked
if I have any spare change or if I would like to join any of a number of
charitable or environmental organizations. Many people talk animatedly
on iPhones or work on iPads. Finally, I arrive at one of a number of
sandwich shops and cafés where I usually eat my lunch. This is not unlike
journeys that most of us take for various purposes in our own cities
every day.
On my journey, I interact with others—work colleagues, a homeless
person, the street preacher—through and with property. Legal theorists
tell us that property is constituted by a set of rights, use privileges and
control powers, entitlements, or any one of dozens of ways of describing
what property is.1 Property theorists might also tell us that those rights,
1. LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER
11–15 (2003); JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 26 (1988); Francis
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or however they describe the content of property, are constituted by the
social relations that exist between others and me and that may or may
not be recognized and enforced by law. They conclude, above all, by
telling us that property is an undeniable part of life.2 And so it is. From
earliest childhood,3 property acts as a sociocultural symbol,4 maintaining
a central, powerful, rhetorical,5 mythological, and emotional hold on our
imaginations.6 It defines the control that we have over our own bodies,7
structures our relationships with others,8 and goes to the core of what is
necessary to achieve proper self-development.9 In every way, property
structures my daily stroll for lunch and everything else that you, those
around me, and I do.
Yet many theorists leave out, or at least fail to identify explicitly,
something important about my journey, about any journey that any of us
ever takes, indeed, about anything that we do. It is the place or the space
in which my journey and any other human activity takes place. Or, in
the context of property, the space in which property exists, operates, and
has meaning in people’s lives; the space in which the social relationships
S. Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 691, 694
(1938).
2. See J. W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 3–6 (1996) (offering an excellent
and succinct outline of property as both a legal and a social institution); STEPHEN R.
MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 1–3 (1990); RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM,
at xii–xiv (1999); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY
1–18 (2000) [hereinafter SINGER, ENTITLEMENT]; JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, THE EDGES OF
THE FIELD: LESSONS ON THE OBLIGATIONS OF OWNERSHIP 1–6 (2000) [hereinafter SINGER,
THE EDGES OF THE FIELD]; UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 1, at 1–2, 11.
3. UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 1, at 1; C.B. Macpherson, The Meaning of
Property, in PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL POSITIONS 1, 1–2 (C.B. Macpherson
ed., 1978).
4. HARRIS, supra note 2, at 8–13.
5. See id. (discussing lay and legal “property talk”).
6. Laura S. Underkuffler, On Property: An Essay, 100 YALE L.J. 127, 128, 147
(1990).
7. MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 154 (1996); Stephen R.
Munzer, An Uneasy Case Against Property Rights in Body Parts, in PROPERTY RIGHTS
259 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1994); Alan Ryan, Self-Ownership, Autonomy, and
Property Rights, in PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra, at 241.
8. C. Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected
Liberty, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 742–43 (1986); Joseph William Singer & Jack M.
Beermann, The Social Origins of Property, 6 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 217, 228 (1993).
9. MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 35–71 (1993). See generally
EARLY MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF PROPERTY (John Brewer & Susan Staves eds., 1996)
(collection of essays).
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that constitute property exist; the space where rights and relationships
structure our lives; and the space that we structure through those rights
and relationships. At every moment of life, we are interacting with others
and the world around us through some form of property—private, common,
or public.
And as we interact with the physical space through which we move—
on my lunchtime walk, it is streets, grassy boulevards, malls, shops, and
cafés—we interact with others and make choices about those interactions—
for me, during lunch, with students, the homeless, proselytizers,
salespeople—and so, social interaction adds a layer to the physical
space. Through our choices and our interactions with physical space and
with others, we structure, create, and produce “social” spaces and over
time, alter and restructure, recreate, and reproduce those physical and
social spaces. And because we are part of it, physical and social space
interacts with us in the same way that we interact with it.
If property is central to our lives, ought not those who theorize about it
say something about this obvious spatial dimension and the ways in
which property plays a role in and influences that dimension? My
argument is that inherent in the meaning, the existence of property—
while admitting that there is no univocal concept of property—one finds
the importance of space, and theorizing about property does say something
about space, but in an incomplete and inexplicit way. A reassembling of
what we already know about property reveals the implicit role of space
in an understanding of what property is. This restructuring requires us to
say something about the constituent elements of human life in society—
social life—something that expressly includes a consideration of the
spatial dimension.
Still in its early stages, a “spatial turn”—the recognition of space as
central to all aspects of human life—has begun to transform the human
sciences:
It arises . . . from a deeply held belief that whatever your interests may be, they
can be significantly advanced by adopting a critical spatial perspective.
Spatial thinking in this sense cannot only enrich our understanding of almost
any subject but has the added potential to extend our practical knowledge into
more effective actions aimed at changing the world for the better.10

In earlier work, I began to explore the role played by property law in
shaping the space in which we live.11 Yet, for two reasons, both of
10.
11.

EDWARD W. SOJA, SEEKING SPATIAL JUSTICE 2–3 (2010).
See generally Paul Babie, How Property Law Shapes Our Landscapes, 38
MONASH U. L. REV., no. 2, 2012, at 1. Others have also considered the role of the spatial
in law generally but not specifically in relation to property. See David Delaney et al.,
Preface to THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES READER: LAW, POWER, AND SPACE, at xiii, xvi–xvii
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which this Article explores, such a spatial turn in the case of property
theory requires further elaboration and exploration. First, analytically,
the spatial turn can be used to reassemble what we already know about
property to recognize expressly the spatial dimension of property, thus
revealing what has always been there but which has rarely been named
and discussed: property emerges from, exists in, and is replicated through
space. Second, and equally important, normatively, revealing the spatial
dimension adds context to the social understanding of property and thereby
allows us to see and encourage further exploration of the role of property
as both the source of spatial injustice12 and a vehicle for achieving
“spatial justice.”13
Part II uses the work of urban sociologist and planning theorist Edward
W. Soja14 to argue that human life comprises three components: (1) history
(Nicholas Blomley et al. eds., 2001) (demonstrating the relationship between law and
geography); Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, Introduction to LAW AND THE CITY
1, 9–10 (Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos ed., 2007) (exploring the spatial as
inherent to the way in which law operates in cities); William Taylor, Introduction to THE
GEOGRAPHY OF LAW: LANDSCAPE, IDENTITY AND REGULATION 1, 1 (William Taylor ed.,
2006) (showing the spatial to be a component of law in its construction of individual
autonomy and identity); Franz von Benda-Beckmann et al., Space and Legal Pluralism:
An Introduction, in SPATIALIZING LAW: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL GEOGRAPHY OF LAW IN
SOCIETY 1, 2–3 (Franz von Benda-Beckmann et al. eds., 2009) (injecting the spatial into
the power structures found in law). Still others have considered property law and its
impact on the geographies that we inhabit. See, e.g., NICHOLAS K. BLOMLEY, LAW,
SPACE, AND THE GEOGRAPHIES OF POWER 4–5 (1994) (exploring the role of property law,
space, and the use of power but not theorizing the spatial as an element in the
construction of property law itself); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky,
Reconfiguring Property in Three Dimensions, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1015, 1022 (2008)
(identifying the spatial as an important aspect of determining ownership of land); Peter
S. Menell & John P. Dwyer, Reunifying Property, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 599, 607 (2002)
(showing how property law structures the control of resources by using early English
settlements in New England as an example).
12. On the relationship between races, property, and space in constructing spatial
injustice, see SINGER, ENTITLEMENT, supra note 2, at 39–44, 64, 72–74, 152–54, and see
generally INTEGRATING SPACES: PROPERTY LAW & RACE, at xvii–xix (Alfred Brophy et
al. eds., 2011), and EDUARDO MOISÉS PEÑALVER & SONIA K. KATYAL, PROPERTY OUTLAWS:
HOW SQUATTERS, PIRATES, AND PROTESTERS IMPROVE THE LAW OF OWNERSHIP 1–20, 64–
70 (2010).
13. See SOJA, supra note 10, at 2.
14. This view of ontology is taken from Edward W. Soja’s trialectic of urban
critical studies. See generally EDWARD W. SOJA, POSTMETROPOLIS: CRITICAL STUDIES OF
CITIES AND REGIONS (2000) [hereinafter SOJA, POSTMETROPOLIS]; EDWARD W. SOJA,
POSTMODERN GEOGRAPHIES: THE REASSERTION OF SPACE IN CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY
(1989) [hereinafter SOJA, POSTMODERN GEOGRAPHIES]; EDWARD W. SOJA, THIRDSPACE:
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and temporality, or what Soja calls “historicality”; (2) social context and
society, or “sociality”; and (3) space, both physical and socially constructed,
or “spatiality.” Taken together, and to emphasize their interrelatedness,
Soja calls these an ontological “trialectic.” Rather than privileging
historicality and sociality over spatiality, as most theoretical discussions
of human ontology traditionally do, it is important to give each dimension
of this trialectic equal importance with the others. In the absence of any
of the three elements, it is impossible to understand fully human life
lived in society and those instances where justice is denied to its members.
Parts III and IV of this Article use Soja’s spatial scaffolding to see property
anew, with the obvious spatial dimension brought to the foreground of a
discussion of property.
Part III of this Article uses the ontological trialectic to reassemble what
we already know about property. This demonstrates that the theory of
property implicitly recognizes the importance of addressing and responding
to each of the three ontological fields. Overlooking any of the three
makes it difficult to understand how property is central to human life.
Part IV shows why this restructuring is important. Recognizing the
interwoven complexity to and inseparability and interdependence of the
ontological elements of property allows space an explicit role in defining
what property is, when it exists, and how it is central to and affected by
human life. But more importantly, it reveals how property is the cause
of spatial injustice, which opens the possibility of using property as a
vehicle both to seek and to achieve spatial justice. This latter task, how
it is that property can seek and achieve spatial justice, is not one that is
fully developed in this Article. Rather, although it points to that possibility,
this Article identifies the types of spatial injustice in which property can
be implicated, leaving to future work the task of recrafting property as a
vehicle of achieving spatial justice. Still, although that task is left for
another day, it is clear that the path, at least in a rough way, lies in the same
processes through which injustice occurs. Part IV, therefore, reflects
upon the emerging definition of spatial injustice, how property is one
source of such injustice, and how recognizing the spatial dimension may
allow us to see and to remedy instances of it. Part V concludes.

JOURNEYS TO LOS ANGELES AND OTHER REAL-AND-IMAGINED PLACES (1996) [hereinafter
SOJA, THIRDSPACE]. Of course, there are others who consider the spatial. See, e.g.,
Michael Dear, Postmodern Bloodlines, in SPACE & SOCIAL THEORY: INTERPRETING
MODERNITY AND POSTMODERNITY 49, 56–60 (Georges Benko & Ulf Strohmayer eds.,
1997) (considering the production of social space).
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II. EDWARD SOJA’S ONTOLOGICAL TRIALECTIC AND SPATIAL JUSTICE
Most conceptions of what it means to be human and how we gain
knowledge about the world around us have been limited to historicality—
history or time—and sociality—social relations or society. Edward
Soja, however, contends that this approach represents a modernist binary
that must be broken open through an injection of space or the spatial
dimension. In other words, there exist three, not two, ontological “fields”
that explain the world around us and the way in which we exist within
it.15 Soja’s work in urban sociology and planning theory is intended to
achieve other objectives; nonetheless, for present purposes, we can
extract from it the notion of an ontological trialectic, which is both a
statement of what the world must be like in order for us to have
knowledge of it and a statement of what it means to exist in the world in
which we live.
The first of these fields, historicality, captures the cache of background
knowledge about the world around us, knowledge that everyone carries
with them, which tells them about and helps them make sense of the
world in which they live. The second field, sociality, captures the social
or sociological dimension of whatever subject we are trying to make
sense of, whether writing a biography, interpreting the significance of a
momentous event, or simply dealing with everyday life. This “social
field” captures the social context within and about which the historical
field provides useful knowledge. There are usually thought to be historical
and social dimensions to every event, every activity, and every life we
consider.16 Soja argues that “[a]lthough there are significant exceptions,
few would deny that understanding the world is, in the most general sense, a
simultaneously historical and social project.”17 These two foundational
components, however, are given an epistemologically privileged status
in almost all attempts to understand what it means to be a social being,
to be human.
In the late twentieth century, the seminal work of theorists like Henri
Lefebvre18 and Michel Foucault19 presented and broke open this otherwise

15. See SOJA, THIRDSPACE, supra note 14, at 10.
16. Id. at 2.
17. Id.; see also id. at 71–72 (explaining how historicality and sociality tend to
peripheralize spatiality).
18. See generally HENRI LEFEBVRE, CRITIQUE OF EVERYDAY LIFE (Gregory Elliott
trans., 2005); HENRI LEFEBVRE, THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE (Donald Nicholson-Smith
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closed, binarist debate between historicality and sociality about the
ontological production of knowledge. Essentially, these theorists argued, to
be complete, the dialectical historical-social approach had to give way to
something that contained space and included all three ontological elements.
For them, the dialectic required the injection of a spatial dimension.
Lefebvre ultimately offered a comprehensive account of the social
production of space,20 while Foucault left us with little more than a group of
reflections on the role of space in dialectical logic and reasoning;21
both rely extensively on history and society in presenting their notions of
space. Yet from the accounts outlined and mapped by these two
intellectuals, contemporary theorists have come to regard space or spatiality
as a “keyword” for understanding culture and society— for understanding
what it means to be human.22
Soja, one of those contemporary scholars, argues that to exist, to “be,”
in the world involves not only historicality and sociality but also space—
spatiality.23 Accepting that it must be included in an understanding of
ontology, the question arises, what does it mean, or more to the point,
what does it include? Undoubtedly it involves space per se—the physical
contextual location.24 But although it is true that physical space is
immutable, primordial, and material, for Soja, this understanding of it
falls far short of its organization and meaning as a product of social
translation, transformation, and lived experience, all of which arise from
purposeful social action.25
Because we are intrinsically spatial beings—active participants in the
construction of our spatial lives and reality—it is necessary to “think
trans., 1974) [hereinafter LEFEBVRE, PRODUCTION OF SPACE]; HENRI LEFEBVRE, THE
SURVIVAL OF CAPITALISM: REPRODUCTIONS OF THE RELATIONS OF PRODUCTIONS (Frank
Bryant trans., 1976); HENRI LEFEBVRE, WRITINGS ON CITIES (Eleonore Kofman & Elizabeth
Lebas eds. & trans., 1996).
19. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE
PRISON (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977); MICHEL FOUCAULT, POLITICS, PHILOSOPHY, CULTURE:
INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS 1977–1984 (Lawrence D. Kriteman ed., Alan Sheridan et
al. trans., 1988); MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS &
OTHER WRITINGS 1972–1977, at 63–77 (Colin Gordon ed., Colin Gordon et al. trans.,
1980); Michel Foucault, Of Other Spaces, 16 DIACRITICS 22 (Jay Miskowiec trans., 1986).
20. LEFEBVRE, PRODUCTION OF SPACE, supra note 18, at 401–26; see also ŁUKASZ
STANEK, HENRI LEFEBVRE ON SPACE: ARCHITECTURE, URBAN RESEARCH, AND THE PRODUCTION
OF THEORY 25–27 (2011).
21. See sources cited supra note 19.
22. DAVID HARVEY, SPACES OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM 119–48 (2006).
23. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
24. See STEPHEN CARR ET AL., PUBLIC SPACE 187–88 (1992); see also BILL
HILLIER, SPACE IS THE MACHINE: A CONFIGURATIONAL THEORY OF ARCHITECTURE 27–29
(1996) (describing how people conceptualize physical space).
25. SOJA, POSTMODERN GEOGRAPHIES, supra note 14, at 79–80.
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differently about the meanings and significance of space and those related
concepts that compose and comprise the inherent spatiality of human
life: place, location, locality, landscape, environment, home, city, region,
territory, and geography.”26 In two ways, social life—society—has a
definite spatial form:
First, it arranges people in space in that it locates them in relation to each other,
with a greater or lesser degree of aggregation and separation, engendering
patterns of movement and encounter that may be dense or sparse within or between
different groupings. Second, it arranges space itself by means of buildings,
boundaries, paths, markers, zones, and so on, so that the physical milieu of that
society also takes on a definite pattern. In both senses a society acquires a
definite and recognisable spatial order.27

Scholars from many disciplines, therefore, continue to give “[i]ncreasing
attention . . . to the problems of the city, urban and regional issues, to
locality, to the body, to place, to the relationships between the local and
the global, to boundaries, to borders, to what can most broadly be described
as the spatiality of human life.”28
Soja therefore argues that spatiality, in addition to physical space,
includes the social production of space, or lived social space—the created
space of social organization and production.29 Both are interrelated,
because although physical space obviously impacts upon, indeed is the
very crucible of lived social space, the latter also influences the former.30
For Soja, this collectively created spatiality and its social consequences
are a vital part of making theoretical and practical sense of life on all
levels—from the intimate to the global.31 Moreover, it represents “a
kind of rebalancing of critical thinking, asserting the importance of the
spatial or geographical imagination against the long-established monopoly
of the historical and sociological imaginations.”32 Thus, an ontological
trialectic is a recognition that history, society, and space are equally
essential to understanding what it means to be a human being living in a
society. Equally important, it recognizes that there is an interwoven
complexity to and an inseparability and interdependence of the three

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

SOJA, THIRDSPACE, supra note 14, at 1.
BILL HILLIER & JULIENNE HANSON, THE SOCIAL LOGIC OF SPACE 26–27 (1984).
Edward Soja, Afterword, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1421, 1423 (1996).
See SOJA, THIRDSPACE, supra note 14, at 1.
SOJA, POSTMODERN GEOGRAPHIES, supra note 14, at 79–80.
SOJA, THIRDSPACE, supra note 14, at 1.
Soja, supra note 28, at 1423.
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fields. Such a change in the way we think about space thus has a
profound impact on the way we study history and society because it
permits the insight that the ontological fields actually contain each
within the other and cannot be understood in isolation one from the other
or epistemologically privileged one over the other. Soja presents a very
useful figure for visualizing this complexity, interdependence, and
inseparability:
FIGURE 133

TRIALECTICS
OF BEING

And above all, though, bringing together the three fields and by rejecting
any privileging of one over the others, the trialectic defends against any
form of “binary reductionism or totalization,”34 a phrase Soja used to
critique the modernist project and its tendency to think in exclusively
privileged binarist terms: “subject/object, subjectivity/objectivity, real/
imagined, body/mind, man/woman, black/white, capital/labor, capitalism/
socialism.”35 All of this concerns Soja, for
[a]ll of these binaries that have defined the development of both theory and
politics for the past 150 years have come under significant attack by a variety
of postmodern critics as being overly exclusive and “totalizing,” ruling out

33. SOJA, THIRDSPACE, supra note 14, at 71 (permission to reproduce granted by
John Wiley & Sons Ltd., Oct. 30, 2012).
34. Id. at 72.
35. Soja, supra note 28, at 1421.
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alternatives and silencing “other” voices that do not fit the strict either/or
choice.36

While disavowing both radical postmodernism and radical modernism,
Soja nonetheless argues that both may provide useful tools, such as the
postmodern “insight that entities that we now think of as separate and
autonomous are not only interdependent but also often contain elements
of their symbolic opposites.”37 But helpful as they may be, Soja rejects
all forms of reductionism designed to rule out alternative possibilities in
favor of only “either/or” choices.38 In place of such binarisms, Soja opts
for a “both/and also” logic for application to the issues of human life.39
This in turn has the advantage of encouraging creative combinations of
matters that fall within more than one of the three elements identified in
the ontological trialectic.40
Is it possible for legal scholars to implement Soja’s ontological
trialectic in order to understand the operation and application of law?41
Soja expresses concern that legal scholars and lawyers may be very
highly socialized in either/or thinking.42 Yet, there are nonetheless ways
in which both/and also approaches to property can be taken, but this
requires one to focus on the way in which geography, or more broadly,
social space, social spatiality, affects law and legal development.
“Geography has always been a fundamental aspect of legal development
and the law has always involved itself with the location of things, with
disputes over turf, territories, boundaries, borders, jurisdictions [or
sovereignty] . . . .”43 There are two modes of linking spatiality and law
in this way: (1) to determine how spatiality—the physical and the social
space—shapes or influences law and legal development, such as property,
and (2) to determine how law shapes social space, “legal understandings
and knowledge of law are applied to help in understanding the social
36. Id.
37. Richard Thompson Ford, Bourgeois Communities: A Review of Gerald Frug’s
City Making, 55 STAN. L. REV. 231, 233 (2003).
38. Soja, supra note 28, at 1421.
39. Id. at 1421–22.
40. SOJA, THIRDSPACE, supra note 14, at 3–5; Soja, supra note 28, at 1424
(arguing more generally that legal scholars can apply this framework to their work).
41. For an example of Soja’s ontological trialectic applied to law, see generally
the collection of articles in Symposium, Surveying Law and Borders, 48 STAN. L. REV.
1037 (1996).
42. Soja, supra note 28, at 1424.
43. Id. at 1425.
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production of space, how social spatiality is constructed and organized
and expressed. This is a more extroverted and more interdisciplinary
approach.”44 The second way in which Soja argues that a both/and also
approach can be taken in legal theory is by recognizing that in making
these links between spatiality and the traditional binaries, there is a link
between local and global that must be explored.45
Spatial thinking, then, allows us to identify instances and events of
systemic injustice and to find ways to do justice, both social and spatial;
in short, “the new urbanization processes have built into their impact the
magnification of economic and extra-economic (racial, gender, ethnic)
inequalities along with destructive consequences for both the built and
natural environments.” 46 Spatial thinking assists us in locating
these processes and their consequences and allows us to see how law
can become a vehicle not merely for locating such injustice but for
correcting it. Law, then, may “reshape the social production of space in
more socially beneficial ways; to restructure the relations between space,
knowledge, and power; to deal more effectively with the problems of
race, class, gender, and all forms of oppression, subjugation, and
exploitation; to create a more forceful notion of spatial justice.”47
Spatial justice means that in viewing the totality of human existence—
historical, social, and spatial—we must identify where injustice is being
done to people and the environment, how it needs to be corrected, and
how we might go about doing that. Applying Soja’s ontological trialectic to
property seeks to identify the ways in which property, which is central to
human life, is one of the principal legal vehicles responsible for the
production of spatial injustice. This project involves reassembling what
we already know about property.
III. REASSEMBLING PROPERTY
If we look closely, contemporary theorizing about property conforms
and responds to the ontological trialectic. The difficulty in seeing this
lies in the way property theory is structured. Some theories emphasize
the role of history and temporality—rights and the stringency of their
protection in law, or the timing of an allocation of rights. Others focus
on the role of social context or society in determining what property is,
when it exists, and how it operates. Others, although few, consider the

44. Id. at 1426.
45. Id. at 1426–27.
46. SOJA, POSTMETROPOLIS, supra note 14, at 410.
47. Soja, supra note 28, at 1429; see also SOJA, POSTMETROPOLIS, supra note 14,
at 407–15 (providing examples of how law can influence the social production of space).

334

[VOL. 50: 323, 2013]

A Forgotten Dimension of Property
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

role played by space—physical or social—in deciding what property is
and whether it exists in a given case. Fewer still expressly explore the
possibility that understanding each of these fields and their interrelatedness
is necessary to understand what property is in any given society.
Thus, although contemporary theory about property does identify these
fields, in the case of space and the relationship between the three, this is
more implicit than explicit. We need a reassembly of what we already
know about property, one that allows us to determine when property might
exist, what it might be like in a given society in a given case, and how it
works in that context, both social and spatial. Above all, it would more
explicitly recognize the interrelatedness of the three fields—the overlaps
and crossovers between the background knowledge of property, its social
constitution, and the space where it happens. If property is central to
human life, then it must be possible to organize the elements of property
theory in such a way to tell us how it corresponds to what being human
in society is like. And by restructuring, reorganizing, and reassembling the
themes that we already find in contemporary property theory according
to this ontological trialectic, we see revealed the importance of accounting
for the spatial dimension in understanding what property is, how it
operates, and how it affects our lives. We might call this the “property
trialectic.” This Part is divided into three subparts, each corresponding to
an ontological field.
A. Historicality: Rights and Allocation
1. Private Property and Bundles of Rights
Although it can be put dozens of different ways and although it might
have been exceptional centuries ago,48 today, it is trite to say that property’s
historical “tools of the trade” consist of a legally enforceable “bundle of
rights” that control a person’s interaction with others and with things.49

48. UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 1, at 16 (suggesting that property rights and powers
are not definitive and cannot be easily defined); see also Underkuffler, supra note 6, at
128 (noting scholars’ difficulty in defining property).
49. On the idea that rights are the background knowledge of modern property, see
Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights Around the
Hearth, 116 YALE L.J. 226, 236–40 (2006), which compares modern property rights to
rights within the traditional household. On the extent of informational knowledge
concerning the rules of property, see Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form,
Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1106 (2003), which argues that bundles
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It all started with private property, which William Blackstone asserted,
is “that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises
over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any
other individual in the universe.”50 Jeremy Bentham added that “[p]roperty
and law are born together, and die together. Before laws were made there
was no property; take away laws, and property ceases.”51
This Blackstone-Bentham view is, though, nothing more than a “simple
and non-social”52 beginning; the contemporary orthodoxy of private
property is built upon the monumental work of Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld53
and A. M. Honoré.54 Although Hohfeld would probably have rejected such
an application of his “jural relations”—rights, powers, privileges, and
immunities—to property,55 others, using an intermixture of jural
relations with Honoré’s eleven standard incidents of ownership—
possession, use, management, income, capital, security, transmissibility
and absence of term, duty to prevent harm, liability to execution, and
residuarity56—have used that reasoning to arrive at a “rights plus” approach
to private property,57 what may be referred to as the “Hohfeld-Honoré
bundle of rights picture of property”58 or simply the “bundle of rights”

of rights are arbitrary and that communicating information is key to understanding
property rights.
50. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2 (emphasis added); see also MUNZER,
supra note 2, at 17 (defining property as a mix of “things” and “relations among
persons”); Stephen R. Munzer, Property as Social Relations, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE
LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 36 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001) (arguing
for a social relations conception of property).
51. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 113 (C. K. Ogden ed., Richard
Hildreth trans., Harcourt, Brace & Co. 1931) (1802). One can only wonder at the implications
of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon’s claim that “property is theft” and even that property is
“homicide.” See PIERRE-JOSEPH PROUDHON, WHAT IS PROPERTY? 13–14, 16, 136 (Donald R.
Kelley & Bonnie G. Smith eds. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1994) (1840).
52. GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF
PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776–1970, at 321 (1997).
53. See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917) [hereinafter Hohfeld, Fundamental
Legal Conceptions I]; Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913) [hereinafter Hohfeld, Fundamental
Legal Conceptions II].
54. See A. M. Honoré, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE: A
COLLABORATIVE WORK 107, 107–47 (A. G. Guest ed., 1961).
55. See HARRIS, supra note 2, at 121.
56. Honoré, supra note 54, at 113.
57. UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 1, at 13.
58. See LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS 11–14,
21–22 (1977); MUNZER, supra note 2, at 17–27; Gerald F. Gaus, Property, Rights, and
Freedom, in PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 209, 212–25.
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picture of property.59 Best known as the “sophisticated” or “legal”
conception of private property, perhaps its best statement is Munzer’s:
[Private] property . . . involves a constellation of Hohfeldian elements,
correlatives, and opposites; a specification of standard incidents of ownership
and other related but less powerful interests; and a catalog of “things” (tangible
and intangible) that are the subjects of these incidents. Hohfeld’s conceptions
are normative modalities. In the more specific form of Honoré’s incidents,
these are the relations that constitute [private] property.60

Essential to this metaphor is the notion of “preference-satisfaction” or
“self-seekingness” in the exercise of private property rights.61 In other
words, “the rules of [a] property institution are premised on the assumption
that, prima facie, [a] person is entirely free to do what he will with his
own, whether by way of use, abuse, or transfer.”62 Moreover, “[h]e may
also, within the terms of the relevant property institution, defend any use
or exercise of power by pointing out that, as owner, he was at liberty to

59. See J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 L. REV. 711,
712 (1996).
60. MUNZER, supra note 2, at 23; see also Penner, supra note 59, at 712–14
(describing the “conventional formulation” of the Hohfeld-Honoré bundle-of-rights thesis).
61. Paul Babie, Why Should I Do This? Private Property, Climate Change and
Christian Sacrifice, in LAW AND RELIGION IN PUBLIC LIFE: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE
165, 170 (Nadirsyah Hosen & Richard Mohr eds., 2011) [hereinafter Babie, Why Should
I Do This?]; see also HARRIS, supra note 2, at 29, 31, 105; MUNZER, supra note 2, at 3–
9; SINGER, ENTITLEMENT, supra note 2, at 30; Gregory S. Alexander, Property as
Propriety, 77 NEB. L. REV. 667, 698–99 (1998); Paul Babie, Choices That Matter: Three
Propositions on the Individual, Private Property, and Anthropogenic Climate Change,
22 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 323 (2010) [hereinafter Babie, Choices That
Matter]; Paul Babie, Climate Change and the Concept of Private Property, in IN THE
WILDS OF CLIMATE LAW 7, 7–36 (Rosemary Lyster ed., 2010), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1539294 [hereinafter Babie, Climate Change and
the Concept of Private Property]; Paul Babie, Climate Change: Government, Private
Property, and Individual Action, 11 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 19, 19–21, 77–78
(2011) [hereinafter Babie, Climate Change], http://www.wcl.american.edu/org/sustainable
development/documents/SDLP-v11-22011winterClimateLawRep.pdf; Paul Babie, How
We Control the Environment and Others, in EXPLORING WILD LAW: THE PHILOSOPHY OF
EARTH JURISPRUDENCE 279, 279–80 (Peter Burdon ed., 2011) [hereinafter Babie, How
We Control]; Paul Babie, Idea, Sovereignty, Eco-colonialism, and the Future: Four
Reflections on Private Property and Climate Change, 19 GRIFFITH L. REV. 527 (2010)
[hereinafter Babie, Idea, Sovereignty, Eco-colonialism, and the Future]; Paul Babie,
Private Property: The Solution or the Source of the Problem?, 2 AMSTERDAM L. F., no.
2, 2010, at 17, 17 [hereinafter Babie, Private Property].
62. HARRIS, supra note 2, at 29.
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suit himself.”63 Of course, according to the sophisticated view, in addition
to protecting the rights themselves against interference from others or
from government, those very laws also impose limits on self-seekingness.64
Although it has come under increasing attack as an appropriate metaphor
to describe property,65 however one describes it, this background
knowledge, the historicality of property, dominates contemporary
mainstream scholarship and judicial decisionmaking66 and is largely
understood, at least in outline, by most people.67 So pervasive has it
become that three strands of approach are evident: (1) “neoconservative”68
or “essentialist” theories, which identify essential rights that constitute
the irreducible core of private property—usually the right to exclude, to
possess, to use, and to dispose;69 (2) “nominalist”70 or “disaggregated”
theories,71 which view private property as having no fixed content, an
empty vessel into which each society’s legal system may pour content

63. Id. at 31.
64. There has yet to be any example in the history of human society where “sole
and despotic dominion” described the on-the-ground distribution of resources or social
wealth. Blackstone himself recognized this. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 50, at *2; see
also Frederick G. Whelan, Property as Artifice: Hume and Blackstone, in PROPERTY:
NOMOS XXII, at 101, 114–25 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980)
(describing Blackstone’s theory of property). For more contemporary critiques, see
Michael A. Heller, Three Faces of Private Property, 79 OR. L. REV. 417, 419 (2000),
and Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J.
601 (1998). Even the Romans—to whom the notion of absolute dominium in things is
often attributed—did not in practice recognize such a possibility. Joshua Getzler, Roman
Ideas of Landownership, in LAND LAW: THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES 81, 82–85 (Susan
Bright & John Dewar eds., 1998).
65. See generally HARRIS, supra note 2; Penner, supra note 59.
66. See, e.g., BECKER, supra note 58, at 11–21; JOHN CHRISTMAN, THE MYTH OF
PROPERTY: TOWARD AN EGALITARIAN THEORY OF OWNERSHIP 3–27 (1994); MUNZER, supra
note 2, at 22–36; UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 1, at 19; WALDRON, supra note 1, at 26–61;
Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1191–92
(1999); Heller, supra note 64, at 418–19; Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics, and
the Law of Property, in ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW: NOMOS XXIV, at 3, 3–40
(J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1982); Munzer, supra note 50, at 36–75;
Penner, supra note 59, at 713–14 n.8.
67. See Ellickson, supra note 49, at 236–40; Smith, supra note 49, at 1106.
68. RADIN, supra note 9, at 121–23.
69. Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right To Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730,
734–35 (1998); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights To
Exclude, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1835, 1838–41 (2006).
70. Merrill, supra note 69, at 734, 737–38. These theorists base their work on
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 66 (G. E. M. Anscombe trans., 3d
ed. 2001); see also BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION
88–99 (1977) (discussing competing definitions of property); Gaus, supra note 58, at 213
n.18 (acknowledging Wittgenstein’s influence).
71. CHRISTMAN, supra note 66, at 20–22.

338

[VOL. 50: 323, 2013]

A Forgotten Dimension of Property
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

according to its cultural, political, or ideological beliefs;72 and (3) hybrid
theories, which combine elements drawn from both essentialism and
nominalism.73 And although theorists may disagree about a unifying core
of legally enforceable rights operative within a property system, they
nonetheless agree that property begins with rights—it is simply a matter
of identifying what they are.74
2. Two Other Ideal Types
To complete the historicality of property, one must add to private
property two other ideal types—common and state/public75—as well as
the boundaries between the three.76 Although it does exist in real-world
societies, 77 true common property is very rare—the atmosphere, for
instance, as contrasted with the public domain of intellectual property.
Rather than describing any real-world place, common property typically
serves as a residual theoretical category necessary to describe any property
regime that is neither private nor state/public.78 It is also a hypothetical
postulate for a theory that attempts to demonstrate conceptually and
logically79 the emergence and ongoing existence of private property in
any society.80 In other words, it is the method of resource allocation in a
society where it cannot be said that private or state/public property
exists, whatever content those categories may have. As a matter of content,
72. Merrill, supra note 69, at 737–39. The seminal authority is Thomas C. Grey,
The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY: NOMOS XXII, supra note 64, at 69–85.
73. Merrill, supra note 69, at 739; see also WALDRON, supra note 1, at 47–53
(exemplifying a hybrid theory).
74. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN.
L. REV. 611, 621–23 (1988).
75. The “ideal-typic” and “ideal types” phraseology was coined by Heller, supra
note 64, at 422; see also Heller, supra note 66, at 1191–92, 1200.
76. See Heller, supra note 66, at 1169.
77. Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1381 n.342
(1993); Heller, supra note 64, at 421 (arguing that property theorists always recognize
that any actual regime should and will contain all elements of the trilogy of private,
commons, and state property).
78. HARRIS, supra note 2, at 110; Heller, supra note 64, at 419.
79. HARRIS, supra note 2, at 111–14.
80. WALDRON, supra note 1, at 277–78; Heller, supra note 64, at 420; Carol M.
Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative Theory,
Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 37, 52 (1990); see also BLACKSTONE, supra
note 50, at *2–8; JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 285–302 (Peter Laslett
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 3d ed. 1988) (1690).
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common property is the absence of any exclusionary rights; rather,
everyone has the privilege, and no one has the right to exclude others in
relation to the resource or thing in question. Michelman says that in the
commons, “[p]eople are legally free to do as they wish, and are able to
do, with whatever objects (conceivably including persons) are in the
[commons].”81 In other words, in the commons, the protections afforded
private or state/public property have not been extended to the resource in
question.82
Many examples of state/public property—sometimes also called
“collective property”83—can be found in existing societies,84 such as
eminent domain land, although, like common property, it also represents
a theoretical counterpostulate to private property. It exists where “the
collective, represented usually by the state, holds all rights of exclusion
and is the sole locus of decision-making regarding use of resources.”85
Thus, drawing parasitically upon private property, this ideal type confers
bundles of rights on agents of the state or other public officials in
relation to certain assets. The only distinction between this and private
property is the fact that unlike its private counterpart, theoretically, no
legitimate, self-seeking, preference-satisfying, or self-regarding exploitation
is allowed; rather, any use is governed by the conceptions of social
function according to the public enterprise in question, typically by
legislative means.86
3. Allocation
Finally, as we know, historicality also involves time or a temporal
dimension. Thus, property theory, too, must require such a component if
it is to explain adequately what property is and when it exists. And it
does—the sophisticated metaphor posits that a legal system confers upon
people or groups of people bundles of rights, whatever they are, at
particular moments in time. As far back as Locke’s “first-possession”
thesis,87 we find a focus on the importance of time, or temporality, in the

81. Michelman, supra note 66, at 5; see also Heller, supra note 64, at 419–20
(discussing Michelman’s definition of common property).
82. HARRIS, supra note 2, at 110.
83. Heller, supra note 64, at 420.
84. MUNZER, supra note 2, at 25.
85. Heller, supra note 64, at 421.
86. HARRIS, supra note 2, at 105.
87. LOCKE, supra note 80, at 275–302; see also David Schmidtz, The Institution of
Property, in PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 42, 42–43 (discussing original acquisition
theory).
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acquisition and fixing of property rights.88 Robert Nozick, for instance,
argues that property rights initially acquired at a particular moment in
time by a legitimate method are fully in the control of the owner—this is
his principle of justice in initial acquisition.89 He adds to this a principle
of transfer, which allows voluntary conveyance of property to another
person partially or wholly.90 The only means of interfering with the
bundle of rights vested in the holder, once acquired—initially or on
transfer—at the particular moment in time is state acquisition on just
terms compensation. The importance of Nozick’s “historical” view of
property91 here is the insight that bundles of rights are acquired and fixed
at particular moments in time. Joseph William Singer says this:
We might call [these] magic moments. At these magic moments, property
rights are created or allocated to a particular owner. Initially, property rights
are acquired by labor or by possession of unowned resources. Subsequently,
those rights can be transferred to others. The principle of transfer implies that
rights can be acquired by purchase or contract, as well as initially through
labor or possession. It also includes the right to leave one’s property at death
by will to whomsoever the owner may choose.92

Differences arise, of course, between theorists regarding whether these
“magic moments” ought alone to determine the allocation of scarce
resources. For Nozick, acts that happen in history fix property rights for
all time.93 Yet, leaving the initial acquisition or moment of transfer to
determine these allocations may result in morally problematic
distributions of resources. For this reason, Singer characterizes Nozick’s
view as inadequate, simplistic, and antihistorical essentially because it
“presumes that the context in which property rights are exercised over
time is a matter of no interest.”94 For Singer, property rights are exercised
over time, and thus, the issue of time is of crucial importance. The
consequences of self-seeking exercises of rights have consequences in
and over time. For this reason, it is not only the magic moments of
acquisition and transfer that matter but also continuing moments in
88. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 53–70 (1995);
R OBERT N OZICK, A NARCHY , S TATE, AND U TOPIA 151–64 (1974); see also SINGER,
ENTITLEMENT, supra note 2, at 171–74; UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 1, at 28–30.
89. NOZICK, supra note 88, at 151–52.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 153–55.
92. SINGER, ENTITLEMENT, supra note 2, at 172.
93. See NOZICK, supra note 88, at 151–53.
94. Id. at 173.
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which property rights are exercised.95 For, as Laura Underkuffler
points out, “property [is] an individual right, fluid in time, established and
re-established as ‘new . . . circumstances . . . justify.’”96
Although one might try to come to terms with what property is without
referring to the background of bundles and magic moments, any such
attempt would ultimately prove futile because one would be speaking an
unrecognizable language to those steeped in the liberal conception of
property that dominates the legal, political, philosophical, economic, or
any other debate about it. As Underkuffler says, although “[p]roperty as
the rights, privileges, powers, and immunities granted over the tangible
and intangible things of the world may not be an unerring guide for
sifting that which is property from that which is not . . . it is a very useful
starting point.”97 And any inquiry into the concept of property starts with
the bundle metaphor,98 which along with allocation, we have called the
historicality of property.
Before moving on to the sociality of property, it might be useful to
attempt a knitting together of the two elements of historicality—rights
and allocation—with a concrete example. Return for a moment, then, to
my short stroll. We can see on that journey each of the three ideal-typic
categories of property at work, and it is obvious that knowing something
about each of them helps us make sense of what is happening in the
world around me. And, of course, the property in the various places
through which I pass was allocated to government, community, and
individuals at some moment in time. Taken alone, though, historicality
is not enough—it only tells us that there are rights that were allocated at
some time and that they allow some actions and disallow others. We do
not know how the rights came into existence or how they operate in
people’s lives. To know about that, about what the rights mean and how
they shape what we see and experience, we need to know that there is a
context, a society of which rights help us to make sense, and that there is
a space that has been produced by those rights within that society and in
which we experience what is happening in time. And so we have arrived
then at the point in this reassembly where little more can be said about
the historicality of property theory without crossing over into sociality.

95. Id. at 173–74; see also UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 1, at 43 (explaining why
fixing property rights at a given moment in time is “highly problematic”).
96. UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 1, at 50 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 454 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
97. UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 1, at 17 (internal quotation marks omitted).
98. Penner, supra note 59, at 712 n.1. Even those who deny the usefulness of the
bundle-of-rights picture nonetheless posit the centrality of rights to any understanding of
the concept of property. See id.
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B. Sociality: Social Origins and the Socially Contingent
Boundaries of Rights
1. The Social Origin of Property
In an attempt to maintain analytical clarity,99 I have deliberately avoided
saying too much about society in understanding the sophisticated view of
property—Part IV examines the interrelationship between the three fields.
Having said that, however, consider Felix Cohen’s important
modification to the bundle-of-rights metaphor:
Private property is a relationship among human beings such that the so-called
owner can exclude others from certain activities or permit others to engage in
those activities and in either case secure the assistance of the law in carrying out
[that] decision.100

In other words, the rights in the bundle are not in relation to things but
are the outcome of relationships among people; the bundle-of-rights picture
is nothing more than a “simple and nonsocial”101 beginning. This idea that
social relationships between people are the source and the origin of
property, that they are constitutive of it—found most forcefully in the
work of “property as social relations” theorists102—is a major shift.
99. The bundle-of-rights metaphor clearly requires some adverting to social
context. HARRIS, supra note 2, at 3–13, 63–99; MUNZER, supra note 2, at 15–36; J. E.
PENNER, THE I DEA OF P ROPERTY IN L AW 1–6 (1997); R ADIN , supra note 9, at 9;
UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 1, at 1–15; WALDRON, supra note 1, at 26–61; Underkuffler,
supra note 6, at 128.
100. Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 373
(1954) (emphasis added).
101. ALEXANDER, supra note 52, at 321.
102. This view can be traced to Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions I, supra
note 53, at 746–57; Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions II, supra note 53, at 45–
55. These ideas were subsequently taken up by the early American legal realists. See
Cohen, supra note 100, at 361–63; Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13
CORNELL L.Q. 8, 12 (1927); Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty,
43 COLUM. L. REV. 603, 604–05 (1943) [hereinafter Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and
Economic Liberty]; Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly NonCoercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 471–73 (1923) [hereinafter Hale, Coercion and
Distribution]. More recently, they have been extensively developed and expanded,
especially by those of the critical legal studies movement. See CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY
AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 4–7
(1994); SINGER, ENTITLEMENT, supra note 2, at 13–15; JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY
LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES, at xlix–l (4th ed. 2006); SINGER, THE EDGES OF
THE FIELD, supra note 2, at 3; UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 1, at 12–13; Baker, supra note
8, at 742–43; Duncan Kennedy, The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault!, 15 LEGAL
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Although historicality posits that rights in relation to things are the
cornerstone of property, the social relations view reveals property to be
relationships between people concerning control over things.
Morris Cohen was the first to claim that private property confers a
form of “sovereignty” on rights holders, creating a relationship between
the person holding such sovereignty and others.103 Felix Cohen,104 as we
have seen, and Hale105 extended this understanding, while contemporary
scholars—most significantly, Macpherson,106 Nedelsky,107 Kennedy,108
Rose,109 Baker,110 and Underkuffler111—have extensively developed and
elaborated it. Joseph William Singer,112 the foremost exemplar of the
current social relations view,113 argues that property comprises a web of
social relationships among people that concern “control and disposition
of valued resources.”114 Singer provides the most succinct summary of
what we can call the “sociality of property”: “Property concerns legal
relations among people regarding control and disposition of valued
STUD. F. 327, 327–30 (1991); C.B. Macpherson, Capitalism and the Changing Concept
of Property, in FEUDALISM, CAPITALISM AND BEYOND 104, 105–06 (Eugene Kamenka &
R.S. Neale eds., 1975); Macpherson, supra note 3, at 1, 199; Jennifer Nedelsky, Law,
Boundaries, and the Bounded Self, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 162, 162–65 (1990) [hereinafter
Nedelsky, Law, Boundaries]; Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources,
Thoughts and Possibilities, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7, 17–22 (1989); Jennifer Nedelsky,
Reconceiving Rights as Relationship, 1 REV. CONST. STUD. 1, 1–5 (1993) [hereinafter
Nedelsky, Reconceiving Rights]; Joseph William Singer, Re-Reading Property, 26 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 711, 712–13 (1992) [hereinafter Singer, Re-Reading Property]; Joseph
William Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 5 (1991) [hereinafter
Singer, Sovereignty and Property]; Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in
Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 975, 1011
[hereinafter Singer, The Legal Rights Debate]; Singer, supra note 74, at 652–54; Singer
& Beermann, supra note 8, at 218–20; Underkuffler, supra note 6, at 147. This view is
not, of course, without its critics. See, e.g., Munzer, supra note 50, at 36–75.
103. Cohen, supra note 102, at 12–14.
104. Cohen, supra note 100, at 361–63.
105. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, supra note 102, at 603–06;
Hale, Coercion and Distribution, supra note 102, at 471–72.
106. Macpherson, supra note 3, at 1–13, 199–207; Macpherson, supra note 102, at
120–24.
107. Nedelsky, Law, Boundaries, supra note 102, at 162–63.
108. Kennedy, supra note 102, at 353.
109. ROSE, supra note 102, at 4–7.
110. Baker, supra note 8, at 744.
111. UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 1, at 11–15; Underkuffler, supra note 6, at 147.
112. SINGER, supra note 102, at 1–5; Singer, Re-Reading Property, supra note 102,
at 712–13; Singer, Sovereignty and Property, supra note 102, at 47–50; Singer, The
Legal Rights Debate, supra note 102, at 978–80; Singer, supra note 74, at 622–23;
Singer & Beermann, supra note 8, at 217–20.
113. See Munzer, supra note 50, at 36–75 (discussing the dangers of an
amalgamation of social relations views).
114. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY 2 (2d ed. 2005).
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resources. Note well: Property concerns relations among people, not
relations between people and things.”115
Thus, to understand the way that property rights work in, affect, and
help us make sense of the world in which we live, one needs to understand
the social context from which they emerge. Indeed, there is no point to
the rights if they do not originate from, operate in, and assist in making
sense of a social context. Given that rights are the foundation of distributing
scarce resources among people, no property theorist today seriously
questions that rights help us make sense of the world around us and that
thus, sociality is necessary to an understanding of a system of property.
2. The Content of the Bundle
Delving further into sociality reveals that because the bundle of rights
is social in origin, property lacks a built-in unitary structure that can be
discerned by logical deduction either from a “conception” of property116
or from the social practices or norms surrounding property use.117
Rather, as Singer and Jack M. Beermann argue,
[P]roperty rights are various. A wide variety of property interests have been
created by private arrangement and recognized by government. . . . [T]he
definition of property rights depends on a host of instrumental and value
judgments and cannot be derived simply by a logical process that appears to be
value neutral and nondiscretionary. . . . [P]roperty rights are socially and
politically constructed by both private action and government policies.118

Property then can be seen only as a dynamic social construct that at
any one moment in time is “a cultural creation and a legal conclusion.”119 It
flows from and has meaning according to its social context.120 Rather
than being acontextual, private property cannot exist without social
context. Property therefore lacks any coherent structure that can predict
with certainty its content; it is an empty vessel into which any content
115.
116.

Id. (footnote omitted).
Some might argue otherwise. See UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 1, at 6, 15, 33;
WALDRON, supra note 1, at 30–33, 432–39; see also Alexandra George, The Difficulty of
Defining “Property,” 25 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 793, 794–95 (2005).
117. Singer & Beermann, supra note 8, at 228. For a fuller explication of this
proposition, see SINGER, ENTITLEMENT, supra note 2, at 1–18; SINGER, supra note 102, at
xlix–l; and SINGER, THE EDGES OF THE FIELD, supra note 2, at 1–6.
118. Singer & Beermann, supra note 8, at 228.
119. Baker, supra note 8, at 744.
120. Underkuffler, supra note 6, at 128.
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can be poured according to the cultural, political, and ideological beliefs
of a particular society. Far from being essential, the presence of any one
right from the bundle identified by historicality is entirely optional; a
society and its legal system can label as property anything it chooses.121
In other words, although there may be background knowledge about
property—the bundle of rights and its allocation122—it is impossible to
identify an objective, acontextual meaning of the content of the bundle
itself. Both for those who believe that property can be identified
working from an attempt to define the bundle of rights and for those who
take a nominalist approach, social context is considered critical in making
sense of what property is for a society.123 The bundle that any property
holder enjoys is packaged and allocated according to social context.
“Understanding what is . . . property is an inductive and iterative process,
one that looks to the chaos of real world relations . . . .”124
3. Autonomy and Socially Contingent Boundaries
A social context-dependent understanding of the content of property
has implications for whether property can secure autonomy for its
holder. Examining property rights without taking account of their social
constitution ignores the many other social functions that property may
serve125 and establishes a metaphor in which “[r]ights define boundaries
others cannot cross and it is those boundaries, enforced by the law, that
ensure individual freedom and autonomy.”126 This “[metaphorical]
boundary . . . misconceives the basis for autonomy,” which depends “not
121. Merrill, supra note 69, at 737–39. This can be traced to the seminal work of
Thomas C. Grey, supra note 72, at 69–85; see also ACKERMAN, supra note 70, at 26–29;
CHRISTMAN, supra note 66, at 20; Robert W. Gordon, Paradoxical Property, in EARLY
MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF PROPERTY 95, 95–110 (John Brewer & Susan Staves eds.,
1995). But see WALDRON, supra note 1, at 47–53.
122. UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 1, at 15. Some argue that it is possible to reconcile
socially contingent conceptions of property with the idea of an acontextual concept of
property. See, e.g., George, supra note 116, at 795, 810.
123. See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 2, at 3–6; MUNZER, supra note 2, at 1–3;
PENNER, supra note 99, at 1–6; RADIN, supra note 9, at 1, 9; WALDRON, supra note 1, at
26. For more recent acceptance of the relevance of social context, see Daniel
Fitzpatrick, Evolution and Chaos in Property Rights Systems: The Third World Tragedy
of Contested Access, 115 YALE L.J. 996, 1016–23 (2006), and George, supra note 116, at
810–13. On the fact that most of these scholars, in one way or another, adopt a bundleof-rights approach whether they say so or not, see David Lametti, Property and
(Perhaps) Justice: A Review Article of James W. Harris, Property and Justice and James
E. Penner, The Idea of Property in Law, 43 MCGILL L.J. 663, 666 (1998) (book review).
124. Heller, supra note 64, at 432.
125. Recall Baker’s list—use value, welfare, personhood, protection, allocation,
and sovereignty. Baker, supra note 8, at 744–55.
126. Nedelsky, Reconceiving Rights, supra note 102, at 7.
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[on] separation, but [on] relationship.”127 Rather than inhibiting freedom
and autonomy, people best function within a web of social relationships
that allow “their own abilities to flourish.”128 According to Singer,
“interdependence is the foundational characteristic of free individuals.”129
For this reason, the “human interactions to be governed [by law should
not be] seen primarily in terms of the clashing of rights and interests, but
in terms of the way patterns of relationship can develop and sustain both
an enriching collective life and the scope for genuine individual
autonomy.”130
In concluding that interdependence is the foundation of autonomy, we
need not dismiss rights but rather must reconceptualize them to reveal the
socially contingent nature of the boundaries between them. Rather than
being rigid and unyielding, boundaries between rights actually operate
within a social context of relationships involving mutual dependence and
obligation.131 Singer argues that
[r]ather than understanding rights and autonomy as “an effort to carve out a
sphere into which the collective cannot intrude,” we understand that because
rights conflict, we must define them partially in terms of the relationships they
instantiate. Property law can therefore be seen as “a means of structuring the
relations between individuals and the sources of collective power so that
autonomy is fostered rather than undermined.”132

Individual autonomy is not the only purpose served by private property,
and indeed, it ought not to be conceived as an absolute value. Rather,
autonomy is conceived and protected and allows people to flourish only
in relationship with others, which means that it becomes possible for
private property to serve a host of social purposes.
Property’s socially contingent boundaries between rights means that it
is constantly being recreated by social context, building upon historicality in
order to explain further and make sense of the ever-changing world in
127. SINGER, ENTITLEMENT, supra note 2, at 130–31 (quoting Nedelsky, Reconceiving
Rights, supra note 102, at 8) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Baker, supra
note 8, at 742–44 (asserting that the basis of property is “relations between people”);
Nedelsky, Reconceiving Rights, supra note 102, at 8 (arguing that this view of autonomy
is “deeply misguided”).
128. SINGER, ENTITLEMENT, supra note 2, at 130–31.
129. Id. at 131.
130. Id. (quoting Nedelsky, Reconceiving Rights, supra note 102, at 8) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
131. Id.
132. Id. (quoting Nedelsky, Reconceiving Rights, supra note 102, at 8).
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which we live. Although historicality provides the framework,133 what
property actually is for a society and how it helps one make sense of the
world depends upon an understanding of social context, which engenders a
sense of community and the bringing together of various communities or
subgroups in relation to scarce resources within a web of socially contingent
boundaries.134 To see this, we must become “hypothetical social
anthropologists,”135 looking for the core or central “organizing idea”—the
network of social relations and intentions colored by shared value-laden
assumptions within which people live their lives, the bulk of which we
take for granted as the background of everything thought or said—around
which that society constructs its system of distributing resources. In
other words, we must look beyond the bundle.
The need to become a hypothetical social anthropologist is powerfully
demonstrated by Singer, who argues that property includes reliance
interests136 and entitlements,137 both of which may or may not be formally
legally recognized or enforceable but which nonetheless constitute a part
of what a society, broadly conceived, recognizes as a component of
its property system. Singer thus demonstrates that sociality adds something
to our understanding of property—it is more than formal, legally recognized
rights alone. A society may take rights that are legally recognized and
shape and modify them to suit new conditions and assist those living in
those conditions to understand them better. Judges, legislators, and we
miss this if we prioritize historicality and ignore sociality.
Remember my lunchtime walk. When we considered the historicality
of property, we saw that the three ideal-typic categories of property were
at work and interacting with one another. We saw that in some way, the
rights that constitute those categories were allocated to their holders in
some way at some time according to legal rules. What we could not see
then was the way those categories of property and the way in which they
were allocated assisted me in making sense of the world through which I
was passing on that walk. Nor did we see much about the way in which
I interacted with those types of property. Historicality makes clear my
legally structured and enforceable relationships with others. It does not
make so clear where private property—the restaurants and cafés, what I
133. See Baker, supra note 8, at 743.
134. HARRIS, supra note 2, at 3–4, 9–10.
135. The phrase “hypothetical anthropologist” was coined by Andrew Reeve,
Convention and Justification: Professor Harris on Property and Justice, 19 OXFORD
J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 331 (1999) (reviewing HARRIS, supra note 2). I have added “social” in
view of the obvious significance of social context to Harris’s understanding of
property.
136. Singer, supra note 74, at 661–63.
137. SINGER, ENTITLEMENT, supra note 2, at 13–14.
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eat there, how I pay for it—exists, how it applies, where it ends, and
what it means. The same can be said of the commons property—the grassy
boulevard and those on it—and the public property—the streetscape—
with which I interact. When we open up social context, then we can see
how the various relationships that constitute those types overlap and interact
with each other. And above all, from this perspective may emerge other
forms of socially created interests in these places—based upon
relationships, formal or informal, with others: the homeless persons leaving
their belongings in public places may have some sort of “entitlement” to
that space; those who are selling things or proselytizing on the street
may have some sort of “right” to do so; and employees of the café may
have some sort of “reliance interest” in relation to the security of their
employment.
Although background knowledge helps us make sense of the world,
only an examination of the social context—the relationships between
people that constitute those rights—from which property emerges and by
which it is constituted reveals that about which we are trying to make
sense. The historicality of property then is only a starting place. Whether
one considers it relevant to understanding what rights a society’s legal
system accepts as part of its property institution or to understanding the
new relationships that build upon those rights and establish boundaries
in relation to autonomy, sociality is an essential component to
understanding what property is, how it works, and how it is central
to human life. Still, although all theorizing tends to focus exclusively on
historicality—a theory of rights—and sociality—the importance of
relationships—we are not finished with our reassembly of property
theory. We might call rights and social context the binarism of property
theory, and that fails to give explicit, and in some cases any, attention to
the spatial dimension. This binarism is not, therefore, enough to give us
a full picture of what property is and how space is important to
understanding it and its importance for human life. That is our next task.
C. Spatiality: Property “Produces” Spatially Contingent Boundaries
We have seen that what we know about property includes historicality
and sociality. To complete the picture of property, however, the trialectic
requires the breaking open of this binarism and the injection of spatiality.
Although it is difficult to find this explicitly theorized, for two reasons,
space is central to an understanding of what property is. First, as my
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daily lunchtime walk demonstrates, the rights that constitute property
operate in and apply to physical space. Waldron says this:
Everything that is done has to be done somewhere. No one is free to perform
an action unless there is somewhere he is free to perform it. Since we are
embodied beings, we always have a location. Moreover, though everyone has
to be somewhere, a person cannot choose any locations he likes. Some
locations are physically inaccessible. And, physical inaccessibility aside, there
are some places one is simply not allowed to be.
One of the functions of property [rights], particularly so far as land is concerned,
is to provide a basis for determining who is allowed to be where. For the
purposes of these rules, a country is divided up into spatially defined regions
or, as we usually say, places. The rules of property give us a way of
determining, in the case of each place, who is allowed to be in that place and
who is not.138

Second, property rights are not only the product of social context,
helping us to explain the physical space in which we live our lives, but
they also, through the choices that we make in exercising them and our
interactions with physical places and with others, produce, affect, alter,
and are affected and altered by the physical space and the social context.
In other words, rights exist, operate in, and are limited by physical and
social space. Both ways in which space matters are connected; in addition
to assisting us in explaining the world around us, most of us have
property—rights constituted by the social context in which we live and
conferred upon us by legal means. And through those rights, we make
choices, interact with the physical space, and produce and reproduce the
social space around us. These ideas require further development, and
this subpart explores what we know about the “spatiality of property,”
looking first at physical space before turning to social space.
1. Physical Space
Accounts of the importance of physical space are common in the
practice of property law but are at best implicit in property theory.139
One can discern two approaches in the literature. The first we might call
“thin,” by which I mean those in which the theorist might agree that
physical space is important to an understanding of what property is and
how it interacts with the world around us without expressly theorizing
that importance. Almost all contemporary theories of property take
138. JEREMY WALDRON, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, in LIBERAL RIGHTS:
COLLECTED PAPERS 1981–1991, at 309, 310 (1993).
139. David Lametti, The Morality of James Harris’s Theory of Property, in
PROPERTIES OF LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JIM HARRIS 138, 159–60 (Timothy Endicott
et al. eds., 2006). For an example, see WALDRON, supra note 138, at 310–11.
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this minimal approach to space. Harris, for instance, argues that
notwithstanding the fact that property might deal with items of social
wealth, it also applies to rights to things—this, Harris says, identifies a
connection between the individual who holds those rights and the physical
environment.140 This is another way of saying that viewing property as
rights attaching to things identifies the physical space in which that right
operates and to which it applies.
Another version of a thin approach looks more broadly at the society
under consideration. A visit to post-Soviet Moscow, for instance, brought
Michael Heller face-to-face with empty storefronts alongside full streetside kiosks. The problem, Heller argued, was that resources were prone
to underuse because multiple owners each had a right to exclude others
from a scarce resource, with none of them enjoying an effective privilege of
use.141 This in turn resulted in an excessive fragmentation of rights
among many users, without any one of them having the ability to make
effective use of the resource.142 Heller identifies a range of contexts in
which such “anticommons tragedies” may arise: the Moscow street,
rapid enterprise privatization, fractionalization of Native American lands,
gimmick giveaways of infinitesimally small parcels of land, and
postearthquake reconstruction in Kobe, Japan.143 In response, Heller
created “anticommons property,” a new theoretical category of property,
to explain this real-world problem.144 Again, although Heller’s examples
clearly allude to the fact that rights work in physical space and that one
sees that operation in such spaces, space is given no explicit theoretical
status.
The second approach to physical space we can call “thick”; theorists in
this camp simultaneously recognize the importance of physical space
and expressly theorize it. One way of achieving that result is to view
property as a relationship between or among individuals, filtered or
140. HARRIS, supra note 2, at 3–14.
141. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 671, 677 (1998); Heller, supra note 64,
at 423–24.
142. Heller, supra note 141, at 671, 677; Heller, supra note 64, at 423–24.
143. Heller, supra note 141, at 679–87. To Heller’s list one could add the
fragmentation of patents over new technology and post-Hurricane Katrina rebuilding in
New Orleans and the Gulf Coast. See Lametti, supra note 139, at 162; Joseph William
Singer, After the Flood: Equality & Humanity in Property Regimes, 52 LOY. L. REV.
243, 245–47 (2006).
144. Heller, supra note 141, at 623–26.
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mediated through objects of social wealth.145 In this way, the object of a
property relationship becomes important because it has an impact upon
the property relationship itself, for “specific objects of property . . . carry
with them duties of stewardship, or obligations to use in a specific
manner.”146 Or one might argue, as does Laura Underkuffler, that physical
dimension is “of critical importance in every legally cognizable conception
of property: until we know the space or conceptual area of field to which
our theory of rights applies, we cannot know—as an actual or functional
matter—what our conception of property is.”147
Thin and thick accounts recognize the importance of physical space in
understanding what property is, but only the latter expressly theorizes that
importance. Such accounts tell us that property involves relationships
and rights that exist in and operate upon objects found within a concrete
physical setting. This is important because focusing on the object may
well tell us more about specific normative duties and obligations or limits
upon rights in relation to it, and an examination of the entire physical
field will tell us more about what that property is, its relevant rights, the
relationships that give rise to those rights, and the way in which those
rights shape and structure the physical space itself. Property, its rights,
and its relationships, by shaping and structuring the physical space around
us, establish what we might call “spatially contingent boundaries” between
people, things, and types of property—private, state/public, and common.
Both accounts of physical space highlight then the fact that property,
whatever it is, interacts with and shapes physical space. But there is
more to the notion of spatially contingent boundaries: although property
shapes and structures physical space, it can and does “produce” a social
space that exists within the physical; those social spaces also constitute
boundaries, again, between people, things, and types of property. We
have seen some of this in the sociality of property, but we must account
more explicitly for this social space as well, for it also influences and is
influenced by property.
2. Social Space
Spatiality captures not only the physical dimension but also the social
or “socially produced space.”148 This is useful for an understanding of
human life within society because it recognizes the importance of the

145. David Lametti, The Concept of Property: Relations Through Objects of Social
Wealth, 53 U. TORONTO L.J. 325, 355 (2003); Lametti, supra note 139, at 149.
146. Lametti, supra note 139, at 160.
147. UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 1, at 23–24.
148. SOJA, THIRDSPACE, supra note 14, at 72.
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relationship between physical and social space. When applied to property,
this spatiality of property opens up the historical-social binarism to reveal
that although rights and social context are present, there is much more to
property than what those two elements alone can tell us. We have already
seen that social relationships are constitutive of property rights—which
may include reliance interests or entitlements—and that they establish
boundaries in relation to autonomy through interdependence. This view,
however, focuses on only those relationships that constitute property,
which are merely a subset of all relationships that constitute the society
in which we live.149 What we have called the sociality of property, in
other words, captures only those social relationships constitutive of property
rights. We might call these “property social relationships.”
The social world in which we live goes far beyond property social
relationships; it includes what we might call the “constellation of all
social relationships.” Unfortunately, most theories of property fail explicitly
to account for this, which represents a serious omission. Overlooking the
broader sphere of relationships surrounding the sociality of property
means that we miss the reality that how people exercise property rights
affects and is affected by the social world in which they live. Exercises
of property rights—historicality—structure, shape, and produce not only
the physical space, as we have seen, but the very social context itself—
sociality—the engine room for the production of the constellation of all
social relationships. The physical and social space so produced itself
restructures, reshapes, and reproduces property. The “new” physical and
social space so produced in turn reshapes property, which again restructures,
reshapes, and reproduces space. And on the cycle goes. This constellation
of all social relationships constitutes “produced space,” which for our
purposes, in turn “produces” property itself, and both reproduce each
other in a dynamic, continuous, reiterative cycle of action and reaction,
as shown in Figure 2.

149.

See Munzer, supra note 50, at 40–41.

353

FIGURE 2150

'PRODUCTION'
OF PROPERTY

The key to this cycle of property production lies in property’s
content—what it confers on its holder. As we saw earlier, that content
concerns rights constituted by relationships among people regarding
control and disposition of valued resources. Yet this alone fails to
capture fully the impact that the exercise of rights has on the world
around us, both physical and social.151 Rather, we must take account of
the interaction of rights within physical and social space. To account for
this, a better way of describing the content of property is to call it what it
is: “decisionmaking authority,” which C. Edwin Baker says is “the role
of property as a claim that other people ought to accede to the will of the
owner, which can be a person, a group, or some other entity. A specific
property right amounts to the decisionmaking authority of the holder of
that right.”152
Exercises of decisionmaking authority permit property holders to alter
unilaterally the physical world and to alter the status of everyone else in
150. This figure is adapted from SOJA, THIRDSPACE, supra note 14, at 71 (permission to
reproduce granted by John Wiley & Sons Ltd., Oct. 30, 2012).
151. SINGER, THE EDGES OF THE FIELD, supra note 2, at 20–21.
152. Baker, supra note 8, at 742–43; see also SINGER, ENTITLEMENT, supra note 2,
at 134–39 (presenting a theory of property rights that focuses on social relations);
SINGER, THE EDGES OF THE FIELD, supra note 2, at 20–21 (discussing how property systems
regulate the relationships among rights holders); Singer, Sovereignty and Property, supra
note 102, at 41 (describing how social relationships are central to property); Singer,
supra note 74, at 655 (describing the social relations approach to property).
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society by involuntarily imposing, amending, or eliminating duties not to
interfere on others.153 Decisionmaking authority then is where choices
about the resources over which we are said to have property are made. It
is the ability, through making a choice, to control, to master, to rule a
part of, and to effect change in the real world. In other words, the content of
property is power; the “world” to which it applies is the totality of the
physical and social space—the constellation of all social relationships—
within which we live.
If unfettered, as social conditions and relationships change, property
runs the risk of producing negative social outcomes in physical and social
space. If such deleterious social outcomes are to be avoided, the underlying
social values and purposes of property require regulation by corresponding
moral imperatives, duties, and obligations154 to monitor the balance between
individual well-being and collective social good. For this reason, in
every society that invokes property as a means of resource distribution,
decisionmaking authority is hemmed in by the state’s police power—the
community’s ability to control and alter the scope of private property
rights over time as their social meaning changes.155 Over time then,
regulation preserves the social function of a property right, whatever it
might be, within a context of relatedness to others, thus protecting others
against harmful outcomes brought about through choices.156 David Lametti
says that
[s]ince . . . property by definition entails scarcity, and since by allocating the
resource through a . . . property regime to individuals we create inequality, it is
thus entirely justifiable and understandable that the institution comes with
strings attached. . . . [P]roperty must in some way serve some greater good in
order to be justified. While definitely important, the promotion of individual
autonomy cannot persuasively stand as the sole reason justifying property rights.
Some other goals, including collective ones, must be served.157

Every property system, in other words, comes with “strings attached”—
moral duties, imperatives, and obligations—manifested in regulation to
ensure the balance between individual and collective.158
153. See Lametti, supra note 145, at 346–47.
154. Id. at 346–48; see also Lametti, supra note 123, at 667–68 (describing further
the duties, responsibilities, and obligations of private property).
155. Singer & Beermann, supra note 8, at 228.
156. Id.
157. Lametti, supra note 139, at 154.
158. See SINGER, ENTITLEMENT, supra note 2, at 205–06; SINGER, THE EDGES OF
THE FIELD, supra note 2, at 41–42.
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To recap: the rights constitutive of property or other interests that may
be recognized as property, such as reliance interests, are produced by
and operate within physical and social space. And the power they place
in the hands of holders has the ability to effect change within, indeed to
“produce” those very spaces. Property social relationships structure what
decisionmaking authority is and will be in relation to any given resource,
and through the exercise of rights, those relationships are also structured
by the very decisionmaking authority they produce. But more significantly,
the constellation of all social relationships—spatiality—itself affects and
produces and is affected and produced by property social relationships and
its resultant rights. Of course property relationships constitute and define
property, but so too does the constellation. The constellation, the subset
of property social relationships, and the interaction of both with physical
space comprises property’s spatiality. The next Part considers the
interrelatedness of the three elements of property as we have reassembled
it.
IV. THE INTERWOVEN COMPLEXITY TO AND INSEPARABILITY AND
INTERDEPENDENCE OF PROPERTY OR, VISIONS OF
SPATIAL INJUSTICE
A. Background
The novelty of this reassembly lies not in its constitutive parts, although
an explicit theorization of spatiality as encompassing the physical and
the social is lacking, but rather, when we look at the real world, the
institution itself exhibits the interwoven complexity, inseparability, and
interdependence of these elements: rights—or historicality, social origins
and socially contingent boundaries—or sociality, and spatially contingent
boundaries within physical and social space—or spatiality. Seeing property
this way reveals aspects of social relationships that we might otherwise
overlook: components of our social world—the constellation of all social
relationships—that affect and are affected by what property is, the way that
rights are structured and defined, their exercisability, and the way that they
are exercised. We see that rights impact upon, construct, and shape the
social context that both gives rise to them and the social context in
which they occur and that the space, both physical—including the
natural environment—and social, in turn has an impact on the way in
which rights are structured. This interwoven complexity, inseparability,
and interdependence is occurring constantly and is dynamic.159 From
this perspective, two important points emerge: first, one cannot prioritize
159.
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one ontological field of property over either of the other two, and second,
from this complexity emerges spatial injustice.
1. Complexity, Inseparability, and Interdependence
In order to understand property and its importance to human life, there
is simply no way in which one can look at any of these elements in the
real world without taking account of the role played by the other two.
No one of the three ontological fields can be epistemologically prioritized
over the others; indeed, by their very nature it would be impossible to do
so. This fluidity is not restricted to the relationship between the three
ontological fields of property but also manifests itself within the elements
themselves. Thus, for example, in the case of historicality, there is fluidity
between the three ideal-typic categories that have been identified, as well as
in relation to new categories, such as Heller’s anticommons and liberal
commons.
Yet, to see this interwoven complexity of property, we must look
beyond decided cases and legislative enactments. Neither of these sources
reveals the importance of viewing property through an ontological
taxonomy. Rather, because they are securely locked within the
historicality of property—rights allocated at magic moments—for judges
and legislators, it is simply a matter of determining in a formulaic
Hohfeld–Honoré way whether the necessary bundle of rights is present.
This fails to comprehend what property is—it fails to comprehend that
property involves, in addition to rights, social context and spatial reality.
It fails to consider the constellation of social relationships occurring
within physical space that do not themselves constitute property but have
an effect on the property that a society does recognize. Rather, as
Robert Ellickson says, “Lawyers and legal scholars understandably tend
to focus on domains of life where law is central.”160 In relation to property,
this misses the fact that much can be learned from a consideration of
the entirety of any social space, not only from the legal arrangements
there, but also from the informal and even the entirely illegal ones. Both
informality and illegality affect and ultimately structure the formal
arrangements and relationships recognized and enforced by law as
property. It is quite possible to find examples of this that demonstrate the

160.

Ellickson, supra note 49, at 229.
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necessity of moving beyond the judicial-legislative view of property to
see it trialectically. Indeed, they abound.
2. Spatial Injustice
From this complexity we can begin to see that property plays a role in
spatial injustice. As we saw in the introduction, spatial injustice as a
concept involves identifying those instances and events of systemic injustice
that may be of racial, gender, ethnic, or economic origin or any combination
of them, that are caused by the economic, social, and political production
of space, both physical and social, and that evolve over time.161 Spatial
thinking assists us in locating these processes and their consequences.
But the point is simple—we are looking for those “unjust geographies in
which we live”162 and the processes that cause them. This Article posits
that one of the processes responsible for unjust geographies is that which
is enshrined by law in property.
If we are looking for the unjust geographies in which we live and for
their causes, then we must also be looking for the ways in which we can
act to change both the processes and so the geographies. This Article is
concerned more with the unjust geographies, but it is worth identifying,
if only in a preliminary way, the ways in which those may be addressed,
if for no other reason than to point the direction of future work. In other
words, we need also to have in the back of our mind the notion of spatial
justice, a concept still in its infancy—frequently, other terms have been
used in the past to describe it: “territorial justice, environmental justice,
the urbanization of justice, or . . . the geography of social justice.”163
Because it is in the early stages of its development, no “cookbook”
definition can be advanced.164 Instead, it is enough at this stage to know
simply that spatial justice is not a substitute for social, economic, or
environmental justice. Rather, it is an amplification and extension of
those concepts into new areas of understanding and political practice.
What this means is that “everything that is social (justice included) is
simultaneously and inherently spatial, just as everything spatial, at least
with regard to the human world, is simultaneously and inherently
socialized.”165 Soja concludes that

161.
162.
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[s]eeing justice spatially aims above all at enhancing our general understanding
of justice as a vital attribute and aspiration in all societies. It seeks to promote
more progressive and participatory forms of democratic politics and social
activism, and to provide new ideas about how to mobilize and maintain cohesive
coalitions and regional confederations of grassroots and justice-oriented social
movements.166

Although my lunchtime stroll might serve as a simple example of the
complexity, inseparability, and interdependence of the three ontological
elements of property and of the production of spatial injustice that they
engender, the world around us provides excellent evidence from which
to draw. Four areas of contemporary spatial life demonstrate the
interwoven complexity to and the interdependence and inseparability of
the property trialectic. The four “communities” selected take us from
intimate to global to demonstrate how formal, legally recognized property
rights work and how the social space from which those rights emerge
and in which they operate produce “new” social and physical contexts in
which new rights may emerge or existing rights may be modified. This
in turn highlights the importance of taking account of spatiality, for
doing so takes a broader view, one that encompasses the constellation of
all social relationships, both those that constitute property and those that
are not directly related to it. Above all though, taken as a whole, the four
communities demonstrate places where both social and spatial justice can
be done.
Before moving on, remember also that the four contexts chosen here
are merely representative of all social contexts and by no means exhaust
the totality of the world in which we live. Each deserves and has been
given elsewhere much more attention than can be given them here. For
our purposes, they are presented in very summary fashion simply to
demonstrate the interconnectedness of the property trialectic.
B. At Home: The Person and “Intimate Community”
“Intimate community” begins with the human person, and it is here
that we find the first and most intimate demonstration of the interwoven
complexity of the trialectic fields of property. As early as 1980, the
United States Supreme Court held that it was possible to patent a living
organism.167 In 1990, the California Supreme Court found that it was
166.
167.

Id. at 6.
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309–10 (1980).
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possible to hold property in human tissue and that the person from
whose body the tissue was taken ceased to have any proprietary claim.168
And very recently, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a DNA segment
that has been isolated but is naturally occurring is a product of nature
and therefore not patent eligible but that cDNA, which is not naturally
occurring, is patent eligible.169
The point about the human person though is this: presently, there are
patents held to over 2000 human genes or twenty percent of all human
genes170—in other words, our own bodies themselves are the first spatial
field defined by property. Whether the possibility of patentability of
genes or human tissue exists or not, the issue of property defining the
human person according to the three trialectic fields is a real one.
Michael Heller describes this problem in his novel as the “tragedy of the
anticommons,” which in the case of the human person involves the
segmenting and fragmenting of the very stuff of which we are made.171
In this sense, the most intimate dimension of human society, the person,
is a spatial component and is therefore a site at which spatial injustice
may occur and has occurred in cases such as Moore and the lower court
decision in Molecular Pathology, in which not the person in whose body
the tissue or gene occurs, but an external party, holds the property.172
And this has real-world consequences that produce spatial injustice, about
which Heller simply asks, “How many more lives could be saved if
biotech property rights were better designed?”173 In short, at this most
intimate level, spatial injustice involves not only control over the basic
components of life but also the cures for life-threatening illnesses.
168. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 492–93 (Cal. 1990).
169. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107,
2111 (2013); see also Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct.
1289, 1305 (2012) (holding along similar lines on the basis that genetic material is part
of the laws of nature).
170. See ‘Deadly Monopolies’? Patenting the Human Body, NPR (Oct. 24, 2011),
http://www.npr.org/2011/10/24/141429392/deadly-monopolies-patenting-the-humanbody; Elizabeth Landau, How Human Genes Become Patented, CNN (May 13, 2009),
http://articles.cnn.com/2009-05-13/health/genes.patent.myriad_1_human-genes-brca1trademark-office?_s=PM:HEALTH; Emily Singer, Gene Patents Ruled Invalid: In a Surprise
Ruling, Myriad’s Controversial Patents on Breast and Ovarian Cancer Susceptibility
Genes Are Struck Down, MIT TECH. REV. (Mar. 30, 2010), http://www.technologyreview.
com/view/418244/gene-patents-ruled-invalid/.
171. MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP
WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES 1–2 (2008).
172. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702
F. Supp. 2d 181, 236–37 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 689 F.3d 1303,
1309 (Fed. Cir. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2119–20; Moore, 793 P.2d at 492–93.
173. HELLER, supra note 171, at 50.
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In order to survive, people need, among other things, shelter. For
many of us, that involves a home, an important human institution—one
that “lies at the core of everyday life.”174 Yet, here, property theory
tends to focus on formal, legally recognized arrangements, notwithstanding
that these are nothing more than background to the informal arrangements
that emerge from and are of greatest significance to the operation of the
household.175 In an examination of the demography of the household,
Robert C. Ellickson found that members of a household—its owners, the
ones who hold the property in the house, and its occupants, those who do
not hold formal, legally recognized property interests—
together manage a real estate enterprise that makes use of inputs of land,
capital, and labor in order to provide shelter, meals, and other services. Members
of [a] . . . household, through their repeated interactions, typically generate a
set of norms to govern their behavior, including their duties to supply
household inputs and their rights to share in household outputs.176

The household is a socially produced space; it is an intimate community
in which rights and relationships interact with one another. Although it
seems so obvious as to go without saying, the space of the household is
not founded solely upon property relationships and the rights they
constitute. Yet, as Ellickson points out, this is the very oversight made
by most who study the household—legal scholars, demographers,
historians, social historians, cultural anthropologists, and sociologists.
And in doing so, these scholars miss important nonproperty relationships
within the household that result in the establishment of informal
relationships that affect not only the way in which formal, legally
recognized relationships exist and the way in which the resulting rights
are exercised but also affect the resulting restructuring and reestablishment
of the informal rights.177
It is therefore important to study the intimate spatiality of the household,
both physical and social, for what it reveals about the “norms, duties, and
rights,” in other words, the “informal property rights” that respond to the
formal property structure—historicality and sociality—and emerge from
this social space.178 But of even greater importance is what it tells us about

174.
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Ellickson, supra note 49, at 229.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 232.
Id. at 297–326.
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the formal, legally recognized property arrangements themselves. These,
through the exercise of choices predicated upon the rights formally
conferred, interact with and restructure the sociality and spatiality
that influenced their emergence in the first place.179 This may have even
broader social importance for, as Ellickson concludes, “scholars who study
the structure of business and governmental organizations can learn from
Aristotle’s basic insight that social arrangements that succeed
within the household commonly inspire creators of more complex
human institutions.”180
C. Stepping into the Street: “Local Community”
Stepping through the front door of the house, one enters the local
surrounds of the home, what we might call the “local community.” Here
again, property theory fails to account for what one finds. When exploring
the local community, property theorists, drawing on the judicially and
legislatively created historicality of property, rivet our attention on rigid
classifications of the physical space around us. These theorists typically
begin with a “property boundary” intended to describe the divisions
between the ideal-typic categories. Sadly, in the real world, the boundary
offers no assistance in making sense of the local community.181 Rather
than neat boundaries and divisions, the real world contains interwoven
examples of each of the three ideal-typic categories of property.182 The
boundary fails to adapt to social and spatial interactions in the real
world, and it fails to show how the ideal-typic categories fit together in a
functioning system of property. We are left, then, with questions: What
constitutes one type of property and what another; where does one type
of property begin and another end, and why? Is a particular set of legal
or social relationships cross-boundary, fitting within one category alone,
or both, or several, or does it shift depending on circumstances and
purposes? The property boundary, founded upon historicality, fails to
provide any answers to these questions.
We can, albeit with great difficulty given the control exerted by judicial
and legislative conceptions, shift our focus from historicality to the
sociality and spatiality of the community. If we do, rigid divisions
disappear. In the real world of the local community, in produced social
spaces, where choice and interaction with others occur, we observe the
ideal-typic theoretical categories of property’s historicality interacting

179.
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with one another,183 rendering almost irrelevant the rigid boundaries
between private, public/state, and common property.184 Some theorists
assist us in this effort, noting the way in which the ideal-typic categories
operate within physical space and interact with and overlap in social
space. 185 Carol Rose, for instance, uses the term “inherently public
property” for all assets over which there is a public right of access, whether
the asset itself is treated by law as private, public/state, or common
property.186 Bruce Ziff points out that rather than neat distinctions
between them, in the real world, the three categories tend to merge in
our consciousness, so that we see public parks and roads sometimes as
common property and other times as public/state property.187 Although
formal title to these lands is placed in public authorities, we all tend to
believe that we have some right to access these places and not to be
excluded from them. And even the public-private divide blurs: ultimate
title to private property may nonetheless remain vested in the state, or at
the very least, the state may retain some interest in that property. In
public parks, for instance, informal, private property-like rules may spring
up in relation to the use of various things found there, such as “fountains,
swings and benches.”188
But just as the household is a produced space, so too is the local
community; indeed, the former exists and operates in and interacts with
the latter. The obvious overlap of the three ideal-typic categories is what
we have called the historicality of property, which on its own, fails to
account for everything that occurs in the real world. The historicality of
property, as we have seen, is concerned with only the way in which rights
are organized to produce the three ideal-typic categories. But it is not
the totality of what we find in the real world. In the real world,
183. See Stuart Banner, Two Properties, One Land: Law and Space in NineteenthCentury New Zealand, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 807, 807–08 (1999); Nicholas Blomley,
Landscapes of Property, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 567, 569 (1998); John Brigham & Diana
R. Gordon, Law in Politics: Struggles over Property and Public Space on New York’s
Lower East Side, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 265, 282 (1996).
184. For a full analysis of these property boundaries, see generally Heller, supra
note 66.
185. See, e.g., BRUCE ZIFF, PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW 8 (3d ed. 2000); Ellickson,
supra note 77, at 1386–87; Heller, supra note 66, at 1191–92; Heller, supra note 64, at
422–32; Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 781 (1986).
186. Rose, supra note 185, at 781.
187. ZIFF, supra note 185, at 8.
188. Id.; see also Ellickson, supra note 77, at 1387.
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historicality interacts with the constellation of social relationships,
producing novel, informal relationships that may or may not be legally
recognized as property. This is where property plays a role in the
production of physical and social space and where that spatiality in turn
plays a role in shaping what property is. Just as was the case with the
household, even more so is the local community not founded solely on
property relationships and resultant rights. Rather, when we step through
our door into the community, we find a world in which not only do the
three ideal-typic categories disappear, merging in our consciousness,
perhaps in a form of property best captured by Rose’s “inherently public
property,” but also a world in which property interacts with all nonproperty
relationships to create new relationships and interactions, which affect
the formal, legally recognized property rights, as well as produce new,
informal property and nonproperty relationships. Exercises of formal,
legally recognized property rights ultimately constitute new informal
property rights, which in turn produce and reproduce spatiality. We see
this when we venture into the community if, of course, we shift our
focus from historicality to the sociality and spatiality of property. We
see this when we move beyond the local surrounds of our homes.
D. Venturing Beyond the End of the Street: “Regional Community”
The corner at the end of our street is not the end of the inseparability
and interdependence of the property trialectic. Rather, just as the local
community exhibits a complex relationship between these three ontological
fields, so does the broader community, what we might call the “regional
community”; this is the community that comprises both cities and rural
areas of life.189 Examples of this community are endless and exist all
around us. This subpart offers only two, drawn from very different parts
of the world: Ukraine and Los Angeles.
1. Ukraine: Poverty and Crime
We have already seen that the former Soviet Union has had difficulty
adapting to postcommunist, market-based capitalism; in other words, the
movement to private property has brought with it substantial growing

189. It might equally have been called the “urban community” simply because
humans increasingly live in large cities. Indeed, more than half of the world’s population
already lives in cities. Emerging-Market Cities, ECONOMIST (Apr. 24, 2012, 7:05 PM),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2012/04/focus-4; see also World Urbanization
Prospects, the 2011 Revision, UNITED NATIONS DEP’T ECON. & SOC. AFF., http://esa.un.
org/unpd/wup/index.htm (last updated Apr. 26, 2012).
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pains.190 Michael Heller’s anticommons property was coined in response to
a walk down a Moscow street.191 Other post-Soviet states have faced
similar obstacles in the transition from public to private property. Indeed,
for many in the former Soviet Union, the cruel reality is that private
property has operated to impoverish rather than liberate, to create instability
rather than certainty. Consider, for example, Ukraine.
By 1991, the year it gained independence, Ukraine was in economic
decline.192 Although its release from Soviet shackles ought to have buoyed
it, its new government faced four problems created by the split: (1) the
removal of the larger Russian economy as the main, if not exclusive,
market for Ukrainian products; (2) the elimination of former Soviet
republics as suppliers of raw materials or finished products necessary for
the production of goods; (3) the increase in energy costs, which under
communism had been kept artificially low; and (4) the ongoing impact
of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster.193 The fact that the major players who
presided over the collapsing Soviet economy were the same ones charged
with transforming Ukraine’s into a market economy only served to
exacerbate the impact of these problems—different views proliferated
within government about the appropriate and necessary policy to direct
the shift from communism to capitalism.194 But as Orest Subtelny says,
whatever method was chosen, putting the old guard in charge was
“comparable to engaging Wall Street ‘sharks’ to transform a capitalist
economy into a communist one. Obviously, most of the new/old Ukrainian
elite had neither the will nor the ability to introduce effective economic
reforms. And if it did introduce reforms, they were usually ones that
served its own interests.”195
In this economic environment, notwithstanding the Ukrainian
Constitution’s requirement that “[t]he use of property shall not cause
harm to the rights, freedoms and dignity of citizens [or] the interests of
society,”196 and in the absence of any other formal laws or legislation to
enforce these hortatory words, the establishment of private property
190. For an excellent account, see generally FEDERICO VARESE, THE RUSSIAN MAFIA:
PRIVATE PROTECTION IN A NEW MARKET ECONOMY (2001).
191. Heller, supra note 141, at 622–23; Heller, supra note 64, at 423–24.
192. OREST SUBTELNY, UKRAINE: A HISTORY 581–82, 618 (4th ed. 2009).
193. Id. at 619.
194. Id. at 619–24.
195. Id. at 619.
196. КОНСТИТУЦІЯ УКРАЇНИ [CONSTITUTION] June 28, 1996, art. 41 (Ukr.); LAND
CODE OF UKRAINE art. 1.3 (2001).
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conferred decisionmaking authority upon Soviet-era oligarchs. This in
turn spurred what we may call “privatization by seizure,” occurring in
various ways: some “simply transformed Communist party funds
and property into private holdings”; others took advantage of monetary
policy to reap huge profits, which were used to purchase entire industrial
sectors, while still others purchased cheap raw materials and “then
obtained hard-to-come-by export licences” to sell them on the world
market.197 In every case, government “connections were more important
than capital” in obtaining private property, resulting in the “rapid
transformation of the most intrepid members of the old Soviet nomenklatura
into incredibly wealthy oligarchs. However, unlike the robber barons of
early capitalism, these new ‘captains of industry’ acquired their wealth
by undermining rather than expanding the economy.”198
Such unfettered self-seeking exercises of newly conferred decisionmaking
authority merely stoked the flames of poverty already smoldering in the
late Soviet era. Rather than correcting an existing problem, private
property had quite the opposite effect—bloating an already serious poverty
among a growing unemployed and indigent population. According to
Subtelny, “Statistics provide only a pale approximation of the depressing
reality.”199 And the statistics were depressing enough—in 1992, “Ukraine’s
economy contracted by 20% while inflation [skyrocketed] by 2500%.”200
“Between 1991 and 2000, the country’s GDP had sunk over 63%, one of
the worst declines in the former USSR,” and “[t]he standard of living
plummeted to the point where about 70% of [the] population [was] close
to or below the poverty line.”201
Poverty is only one side of the coin. The lack of regulation that might
alleviate it202 also leads to systemic instability and a lack of what Munzer
calls “actual control.”203 In other words, “If burglaries are rampant, the
owner’s actual ability to exclude others may fall well short of his legal
power to exclude them.”204 The creation of private property, in the absence
of any legally enforceable protection for that right, means that the
security normally associated with this institution is lacking. This may
result in alternative, usually illegal, means of ensuring control of
the resource. Moreover, in the absence of state-sanctioned means of
197. SUBTELNY, supra note 192, at 621.
198. Id. at 621–22.
199. Id. at 589.
200. Id. (citing Chrystia Freeland & Edward Balls, Facing Harsh Realities, FIN.
TIMES, Jan. 27, 1993, at 29).
201. Id. at 618.
202. See ZIFF, supra note 185, at 73–77.
203. MUNZER, supra note 2, at 92.
204. Id. (emphasis added).
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protecting exclusivity, further criminal opportunities emerge as those
with property seek to exploit the systemic instability, creating “incentives to
strip assets, corrupt officials, evade taxes, illegally export capitals and
launder money.”205 Indeed, this is the very thing that has happened in
Ukraine and in most post-Soviet states.206 This leads in turn to further
inequality of distribution of scarce resources and further poverty. For
those with property, in the absence of the monitoring and regulation
necessary to prevent unequal holdings and negative social outcomes,
there is little of the security normally associated with property rights.
This produces criminal forms of protection and opportunities for further
criminal activity, further inequality, and ultimately more crime. These
illegal forms of protection and the criminal opportunities that result from
a lack of regulation are the informal property and nonproperty relationships
that emerge from formal, legally recognized property but that we only
see when we shift our focus from rights alone—historicality—to the totality
of what is happening in the real world—the sociality and spatiality of
property.
There is nothing new in identifying the relationship between property,
poverty, and crime. David Harvey has summarized this nexus as a form
of “uneven geographical developments” in which the steady progression
of neoliberal economic, social, and legal forces structure the world
according to a specific view of how humans interact, leaving in their
wake the “unpalatable aspects of neoliberalism,” most notably financial
crises.207 In the context of property theory, what the Ukrainian example
demonstrates is this: the source of poverty, an aspect of human life,
involves the totality of a property system—the rights conferred by private
property, the social context from which they emerge, and the spatiality
within which they operate, on which they have an impact, and of which
they are both product and producer.208 There is no way to separate one
dimension of the property trialectic from or privilege it over the others;
if one does, an important part of the solution to this social problem is
missed. Indeed, an important part of the problem itself is missed.
The example makes clear not only the necessity of looking at all three
of the elements of human life found in property but also the need for
205.
206.
207.
119.
208.

VARESE, supra note 190, at 36.
See id. at 1–36.
DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 87 (2005); see id. at 87–
See id. at 2.
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monitoring and regulating their interaction in the real world. The failure
to do so results in a failure to account for negative outcomes, such as
poverty, which in turn has an impact on the social relationships that give
rise to property. It affects the broader constellation of social relationships
and in this case, opens up further criminal possibilities to exacerbate an
already unequal distribution of wealth, which produces informal “property
rights” requiring illegal means of protection. All of this affects the existence
and operation of formal, legally recognized property rights, such as the
actual control available to the holder of those rights in response to the
exigencies of the spatial dimension.
As with the human person, the home, and the local community, when
we look at the larger community, we see a socially produced space in
which formal, legally recognized rights may exist but in which nonlegal,
informal rights emerge in order to adapt to the spatial dimension. But
can the informal property relationships and rights that emerge in a
spatiality, such as that found in Ukraine, in fact produce new variants of
formal, legally recognized property rights, as opposed to altering simply
the exercisability of those that already exist? The next subpart examines
how new variants of formal, legal rights can be produced in response to
a spatial dimension in which crime is rampant and how this can in turn
lead to spatial injustice.
2. Los Angeles: Gangs and Common Interest Developments
There is no doubt that crime strongly shapes the social and spatial
fabric of contemporary urban life.209 Los Angeles—immortalized in
numerous movies framed by Colors (1988) and Crash (2004)—represents
the exemplar of urban American crime.210 The unequal distribution of
wealth and resources and the disparity between property and no property
and haves and have-nots produces poverty that goes hand in hand with
crime, gang-related activities, and “turfs.”211 In its totality, this constitutes a
socially produced urban spatiality.212 From that spatiality and the
interaction of poverty, crime, and gang membership213 emerges an ever-

209. See R OBERT W. B URCHELL ET AL ., S PRAWL C OSTS : ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF
UNCHECKED DEVELOPMENT 140–44, 163 (2005); MIKE DAVIS, CITY OF QUARTZ: EXCAVATING
THE FUTURE IN LOS ANGELES 223–322 (1992); DAVID HILFIKER, URBAN INJUSTICE: HOW
GHETTOS HAPPEN 45–61 (2002); SOJA, POSTMETROPOLIS, supra note 14, at 298–322;
THOMAS J. SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE AND INEQUALITY IN POSTWAR
DETROIT 206–07, 217 (2005).
210. See DAVIS, supra note 209, at 223–26.
211. See id. at 293–309.
212. See generally SOJA, POSTMETROPOLIS, supra note 14, at 115–415.
213. DAVIS, supra note 209, at 270; SOJA, POSTMETROPOLIS, supra note 14, at 302.
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increasing destruction of public space, an increased security offensive,
both public and private, and the hemming in of the homeless into a “Skid
Row.”214 Similar urban spatialities are replicated to greater or lesser degrees
in every major city worldwide.215
Gangs drastically alter life at every level, including property, for those
in Los Angeles: police activity, community development, fear of crime—
whether perceived or real—and drug use and abuse are all outcomes of
gang-related crime.216 These activities lead to a redistribution of the land
resource as well. Although formal, legally recognized property rights may
allocate public and private space in one way, the lived reality of the
spatiality is very different. Gang “territories” or “turfs” dominate the poorer
parts of Los Angeles; as such, any recourse to formal, legal property rights
becomes irrelevant as “a quiltwork of blue-ragged Crips [a gang], both
Eastside and Westside, as well as miscellany of other gangs”217 operates
at an informal and illegal level to control spaces and what happens
there.218 Soja explains how this affects the intimate, local, and regional
communities identified earlier:
At a much more intimate scale in [Los Angeles] is a household militia of
extraordinary proportions. Lethal weapons are kept in most homes and in an
increasing number of automobiles, creating a heterogeneous, fragmented, and
highly mobile civilian armed force capable of shooting all trespassers on sight,
wherever they may roam. Patrolling the private turfs, edges, and transgressions of
the carceral postmetropolis, this localized army aims also to make and mark
space, and contributes to keeping everyone in their proper place, whether it be
not-in-my-back-yard or not-in-my-freeway-lane. The potential for everyday
violence is thus raised to new heights, triggering often-fatal attractions to a
disciplinary technology of security and surveillance that patrols the region with
endless eyes.219

214. SOJA, POSTMETROPOLIS, supra note 14, at 304 (citing DAVIS, supra note 209,
at 226–27). The “Skid Row” policy of the Los Angeles civic authorities became the
subject of a cruel and unusual punishment claim under the Eight Amendment to the
United States Constitution in Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1120 (9th Cir.
2006). On the issue of property and homelessness, see WALDRON, supra note 138, at
309–38.
215. See SOJA, POSTMETROPOLIS, supra note 14, at 396–415.
216. See DAVIS, supra note 209, at 226–31.
217. Id. at 299, 301 (citing L.A. POLICE DEP’T., 77TH ST. DIV., 1972 GANG MAP
(1972)).
218. Id. at 309–16.
219. SOJA, POSTMETROPOLIS, supra note 14, at 309.
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New forms of “property”—in weapons, drugs, and turf—develop in
the lived urban spatiality of Los Angeles. Although it may be informal
and illegal, the consequences for both gang and nongang residents are
very real: the lack of safety and fear of crime, the terrible human toll of
guns and drugs, especially rising juvenile crime and hospital admissions
for drug trauma, and the increased police presence resulting in limited
freedom for everyone. Hemmed in on three sides by armed residents,
gang turfs, and a police presence, residents in the poorer areas of Los
Angeles live in nothing less than a war zone.220 This affects property
from the intimate community of the home, where fear and a “household
militia” prevail, to the local community, where drugs and boundary
disputes over “turfs” and “territories” cut private, commons, and public
property along lines not formally recognized in the regional community.
With actual control and enforceability of rights normally associated
with private property vanishing and with the emergence of turf
battlegrounds on formerly common and state/public property and
concomitant police raids, a person’s home is no longer one’s castle. And
property rights and even social context can tell us little about what is
happening here. The former focuses on the formal, legally recognized
rights themselves while the latter focuses on the way in which those rights
emerge from and operate within a network of property social relationships.
Those focusing on only the property social relationships argue that this
is how the rights emerged, while those focusing on the rights tell us that
the rights are still there, although they might agree, given their limited
enforceability, that they have less meaning than for those who do not
live in such places. At the regional community level, then, the
overwhelming response to this altered spatial reality is “urban flight,”221
producing in turn urban “sprawl.”222
The reality of life in gang turfs, the resulting fear created by gang
activities and drug use—spawning its own crime—and the resulting sprawl
have an impact on property. We see this when we look at the regional
spatiality of Los Angeles. Within this ever-expanding metropolis—and
most major world cities—one finds new communities springing up in
the exurbs and the suburbs—“luxury island sanctuaries, residential areas
with ‘clout’ enough to partition themselves off fearfully from the real and

220. DAVIS, supra note 209, at 267–71.
221. See Immigration in California: Escape from LA, ECONOMIST, Mar. 31, 2007, at 40.
222. BURCHELL ET AL., supra note 209, at 140–44. On the phenomenon of urban
sprawl, see generally ROBERT BRUEGMANN, SPRAWL: A COMPACT HISTORY (2005), and
Nicole Stelle Garnett, Save the Cities, Stop the Suburbs?, 116 YALE L.J. 598 (2006)
(reviewing BRUEGMANN, supra, and JOEL KOTKIN, THE CITY: A GLOBAL HISTORY (2005)).
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imagined spaces of the criminalized poor.”223 These new communities
go by many different names. “Common interest developments” (CIDs)—
known by lawyers as “association-administered servitude regimes”—are
formed by contractual agreements that bind all residents to certain rights
and obligations.224 The contracts are often “‘themed’ around a chosen
image for the community [such as] . . . Greek Island Villa [or] Hawaiian
Resort.”225 All have homeowners’ associations (HOAs) or residential
community associations (RCAs), although not all of these are CIDs.226
There are nearly 200,000 RCAs in California, which includes most “HOAs
and nearly all CIDs.”227 Cutting across all of these are “gated communities,”
which can be found in both the poor inner suburbs and the “wealthy
Outer City.”228 Blakely and Snyder explain gated communities as
residential areas with restricted access in which normally public spaces are
privatized. They are security developments with designated perimeters,
usually walls or fences, and controlled entrances that are intended to prevent
penetration by nonresidents. They include new developments and older areas
retrofitted with gates and fences, and they are found from the inner cities to the
exurbs and from the richest neighborhoods to the poorest.229

Statistics are difficult to compile, but across the United States there are
an estimated 20,000–30,000 of these communities, with more than 3
million households and 8.4 million residents.230
Flight from crime or the perception of it may not be the only cause of
the establishment of these new communities,231 but it is a major one.232
And once there, one finds that the community controls every aspect of
what one might otherwise do with one’s home, prescribing everything
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

SOJA, POSTMETROPOLIS, supra note 14, at 313.
Id. at 315.
Id.
Id. at 315–16.
Id. at 316.
Id.
E DWARD J. B LAKELY & M ARY G AIL S NYDER , F ORTRESS A MERICA : G ATED
COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (1997); see also SOJA, POSTMETROPOLIS, supra
note 14, at 316 (citing BLAKELY & SNYDER, supra, at 7).
230. SOJA, POSTMETROPOLIS, supra note 14, at 316 (citing BLAKELY & SNYDER, supra
note 229, at 7).
231. Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J.
549, 567 (2001).
232. SOJA, POSTMETROPOLIS, supra note 14, at 313 (citing Stephen Braun & Judy
Pasternak, Even an Island Sanctuary Can’t Stem Fear of Crime, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 31,
1994, at A1).
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from the color and the decor to the residential theme, all “spelled out
in . . . contracts with the developer” imposing restrictive covenants.233
And this produces unique forms of social relationship, in which fear of
the very thing from which the residents have fled—crime—remains
ever-present:
If the [gated community] is a sanctuary from crime’s realities, it is also a
marker of fear’s distant reach.
Perhaps that is why one water front mansion bristles with video surveillance
cameras and electronic listening devices. Neighbors debate endlessly whether
to upgrade the 30 year old gatehouse where private guards watch the only road
inside. Roving security patrols remind residents to keep their garages closed.
Driving off the Island into the real world, “all our shields go right up,” says
one resident . . . .
....
234

“I don’t go downtown . . . [e]ver,” said [another] . . . resident . . . .

It seems that in their attempt to ensure greater security from crime,
those who establish and live in gated communities have simply exchanged
one form of pressure—crime outside the community—for another—fear
of crime and the informal property rights that have emerged through
contract or nonproperty social relationships within the community. Or
perhaps, given that these are “gated” communities, they have simply
multiplied the pressure of modern life by adding fear of crime, social
ostracism, and informal property arrangements to the reality of crime.
Our concern here, of course, is whether this trend produces variations
in formal, legally recognized property rights. The answer is almost
certainly yes. There is little doubt that the ideal-typic categories of property
are no longer the same in such communities. The formal, legally
recognized property rights that constitute its historicality may still be
present, but the social context that originally constituted those rights has
changed and so has the spatial dimension in which they now operate.
And new forms of rights, either formal or informal, have emerged. This
has not escaped theoretical inquiry. Hanoch Dagan and Michael Heller
have argued that many such communities emerge from widely held values
particular to the social setting under scrutiny.235 These theorists argue
that what is happening here is a new form of property known as “liberal
commons,” which is an ideal type distinct from both private and commons
property but which draws elements from each. They define it this way:

233.
234.
235.
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Any legal regime can qualify as a liberal commons when it enables a limited
group of owners to capture the economic and social benefits from cooperative
use of a scarce resource, while also ensuring autonomy to individual members . . . .
Constructing a successful liberal commons is always challenging, but it is not
an inherently contradictory or practically unattainable goal.236

The key here is not the gated community or the CID itself, which as
every gated community, clearly is a response to the turmoil of life in
urban spatialities, such as Los Angeles, based upon widely held values—
fear and a desire for safety. The central importance of examining these
communities is that the threat or perceived threat of crime resulting from
increased gang violence—nonproperty relationships—has an impact
upon the way in which formal, legally recognized property rights and the
social relationships that give rise to them operate. When one views the
spatiality of Los Angeles, there is much more occurring than is revealed
simply through an analysis of the historicality of property or the sociality
in which it provides useful information and from which it emerges. The
spatiality results in new arrangements among groups of people in
response to the constellation of all social relationships. Liberal commons
property may be nothing more than a modification of private and commons
property rights to suit a changing sociality and spatiality. But it is formal,
legally recognized, and protected, and it is a response to social changes
occurring at an informal and illegal level in physical and social space.
E. Crossing International Borders: “Global Community”
Sociality and spatiality do not stop at our civic or national borders.
We have seen in the intimate, local, and regional communities that
formal property rights operate in those spatialities to affect not only the
intracommunity spatiality but also intercommunity life. In other words,
each of these communities is connected. We have seen how informal
property rights can emerge within the home, both as between the property
and nonproperty holders to achieve tasks and outputs and as between
those residents in the home and those not—increased fear-producing
alternative means of protection and security—which in turn result in
changes to the local community where public places become turfs and
territories, themselves alternative and illegal forms of “property.” This
can in turn produce new forms of legally recognized property in the

236.

Id. at 553 (footnote omitted).

373

regional community, such as the liberal commons property of CIDs and
gated communities.
Of course, what is happening at the broader community level also
influences the intimate, as demonstrated by the fear of crime leading to
the establishment of HOAs, CIDs, and gated communities, which induce
individual homeowners or residents of nongated communities to purchase
guns for increased protection, changing the way in which the private
property of the home interacts with the local community and the public
and commons property there. There is no way to identify the sole factor
leading to any of these outcomes; rather, the totality of the property trialectic
must be viewed as a whole in order to see and to understand these
relationships and connections. Thus, the simple diagram we saw in
Figure 2 requires some modification, in Figure 3, to add the additional
components that lie behind historicality—the common, private, and public
ideal types; sociality—relationship, community, and obligation; and
spatiality—intimate, local, regional, and global. The trialetic, as its name
suggests and as we have seen, is ongoing and recursive, constantly
restructuring and reproducing property, both formal and informal.
FIGURE 3237

INTERWOVEN
COMPLEXITY TO AND
INSEPARABILITY AND
INTERDEPENDENCE
OF PROPERTY

237.
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The connections between communities in one city and its region extend
to the same sorts of synergies found in other cities and their regions and
to other state divisions. Thus, our activities in the intimate, local, and
regional communities affect the broadest spatiality. We are now well
aware of our interconnectedness at a global level, which means that what
we do in the spatiality of one community anywhere on the globe has an
impact on the spatiality of another community somewhere else. In other
words, the interconnectedness of communities through property means
that the entire globe is a community, the “global community.” What we
do with resources, assets, and intangible things through the exercise of
property rights has an impact on the broader global spatiality in which
we live. Consider this hypothetical:
Imagine . . . an affluent gated community on the New Jersey shore. Some of
the inhabitants move . . . on a daily basis into and out of the financial district of
Manhattan where they set in motion movements of credit and investment
moneys that affect social life across the globe, earning thereby the immense
money power that permits them to import back into . . . their gated community
all of the energy, exotic foods and wondrous commodities they need to secure
their privileged lifestyle. The inhabitants feel vaguely threatened, however,
because they sense that there is a visceral, undefinable and unlocatable hatred
of all things American arising in the world out there and its name is
“terrorism.” They support a government that promises to protect them from
this nebulous threat. But they become increasingly paranoid about the hostility
they sense in the world around them and increasingly look to build up their . . .
space to protect themselves, building higher and higher walls, even hiring
armed guards to protect the borders. Meanwhile, their profligate consumption
of energy to power their bullet-proof humvees that take them into the city
every day, proves the straw that breaks the back of global climate change.
Atmospheric patterns of circulation shift dramatically. Then, in the compelling
but rather inaccurate popularized depiction of chaos theory, a butterfly flaps its
wings in Hong Kong and a devastating hurricane hits the New Jersey shore and
wipes out the gated community. Many residents die because they are so
fearful of the outside that they ignore the warnings to evacuate.238

Although this scenario239 deals with the global impact of capitalism, it
demonstrates the interwoven complexity to and inseparability and
interdependence of property in each of the communities we have seen.
238. HARVEY, supra note 22, at 134–36.
239. A real-life example is found in Southern California’s ports, where international
trade of goods, both imported and exported, requires labor and industry, in turn making
extensive use of fossil fuels, which produce carbon emissions, leading to global
warming, which affects the very international environment that trade is intended to
benefit. See California’s Ports: Smoke on the Water, ECONOMIST, Apr. 28, 2007, at 54.
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What one does with one form of property in one place—the movement
of credit and capital in the global community—creates a lack of it in
another—poverty and starvation in the local and regional community.
The creation of ever-greater security fortresses in one place—gated
communities locally and protection against terrorism globally—results
in less security in another—poverty, homelessness, weapons, and drugs
locally, regionally, and globally. The ever-increasing use of fossil fuels in
one place—Humvees and energy-inefficient homes in the intimate, local,
and regional communities—produces global warming and climate change
in another—severe weather events, such as hurricanes, in the global
community. This hypothetical demonstrates that property can have an
impact upon both the social and the physical space in which its rights are
exercised. Even more, it is not confined to the immediate spatiality—the
effects can be intimate, local, regional, and global.240
But this is only a hypothetical, right? Wrong. Human activity is a
major contributor to global warming. The United Nations Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change is clear that there is a substantial scientific link
between human activity and global warming.241 And although recent years
have seen a decline in the popular perception of climate change as the
cause of many of the extreme weather events witnessed the world over,
recent scholarship confirms that climate change remains a real and
serious threat to humanity;242 indeed, some scientists may even be changing
from a position of skepticism to one of acceptance of the role human
activity plays in warming the climate.243
By “human activity” I mean cars, homes, factories, energy production,
and so on. And the link between this human activity and the carbon
emissions that cause global warming is the concept and the institution of
property, for it confers the decisionmaking authority over things the
exercise of which results in carbon emissions from things such as cars,
homes, and factories. There are the obvious consequences of global
warming—rising sea levels brought about by the melting of polar ice,
240. ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE SHARE: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE COMMON
GOOD 37–38 (2003). Freyfogle calls this national and international interconnectedness
the “ecological view” of property. Id.
241. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
SYNTHESIS REPORT 26 (2007).
242. James Hansen et al., Perception of Climate Change, 109 PNAS 14726 (2012);
see also Cullen Joins Lateline, LATELINE (Aug. 29, 2012), http://www.abc.net.au/late
line/content/2012/s3579042.htm (discussing the alarming new climate change data
reported in the Hansen et al. study). For a general discussion of the effect of climate
change on natural disasters, see BILL MCGUIRE, WAKING THE GIANT: HOW A CHANGING
CLIMATE TRIGGERS EARTHQUAKES, TSUNAMIS, AND VOLCANOES (2012).
243. Climate Conversion, NEW SCIENTIST, Aug. 4, 2012, at 4; Richard A. Muller,
The Conversion of a Climate-Change Skeptic, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2012, at A19.
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which affects social life in communities around the globe, in extreme
cases resulting in the complete dislocation of people—“environmental
refugees”244—and more extreme outcomes, such as the hypothetical we
saw above, are possible. Severe weather events, which continue to affect
agriculture and almost every other economic and social activity the world
over,245 are the direct result of global warming, which, as we have seen,
is a direct result of human activity,246 which is, in turn, as we have seen,
facilitated by property.247
We already know that the property trialectic is cyclical; thus, if
property can be identified as the ultimate cause of the global warming
brought about through human activity, then it must be the case that the
ultimate outcome, the severe weather event—take Hurricane Katrina as a
recent and well-known example—has an impact on property, both formal
and legally recognized and informal, at every level of community. There is
little question that Hurricane Katrina left in its path radical changes to
the sociality and spatiality of New Orleans. In the immediate aftermath,
increased crime, especially looting, and homelessness altered the actual
enforceability and security of formal property rights, thus affecting their
exercisability.248 Long-term changes included vacant land where homes
were destroyed and which now stand empty, with former residents unable
or unwilling to reoccupy them due to their derelict state or because they
are waiting for insurance payouts or other forms of government aid.249
The physical space is affected by this; in some places, a year after the storm,
toxically moldy houses stood empty with nonworking refrigerators full
of rotting food, making it impossible for entire local communities to

244. Sara C. Aminzadeh, Note, A Moral Imperative: The Human Rights Implications of
Climate Change, 30 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 231, 256 (2007).
245. See Hansen et al., supra note 242, at 1.
246. Id.; Climate Conversion, supra note 243, at 4; Muller, supra note 243.
247. Babie, Choices That Matter, supra note 61, at 323; Babie, Climate Change,
supra note 61, at 19–21; Babie, Climate Change and the Concept of Private Property,
supra note 61, at 7; Babie, supra note 11, at 5; Babie, How We Control, supra note 61, at
279; Babie, Idea, Sovereignty, Eco-colonialism, and the Future, supra note 61, at 527–28;
Babie, Private Property, supra note 61, at 17; Babie, Why Should I Do This?, supra note
61, at 166.
248. See Nancy Gibbs, An American Tragedy, TIME, Sept. 12, 2005, at 45; Hurricane
Katrina: After the Flood, ECONOMIST, Sept. 3, 2005, at 28.
249. See Cathy Booth Thomas, You’re on Your Own: On the Eve of Hurricane
Season, New Orleans Has Learned Katrina’s Lesson: Trust No One and Nothing, TIME,
May 29, 2006, at 25.
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rebuild.250 New communities sprang up—rather than living in homes,
many residents now live in newly established trailer parks originally
intended to be temporary.251 In some areas that are being rebuilt, larger
expensive houses replace smaller inexpensive ones, exacerbating the pain
of the poor, who were already suffering before the storm.252 Landlords
drag their feet regarding whether to rebuild accommodations for the poor,
thus displacing them, without possibility of return even to collect
possessions, and scattering them to other areas and other cities.253
Even as structures are rebuilt, there are further problems created by the
lack of labor to fill the construction industry.254
All of this affects the intimate, local, and regional communities—as
people left New Orleans for safety in other cities, families were split up,
fracturing the intimate community of the home and the local community
of the neighborhood.255 At the regional level, a massive influx of people
to Houston altered its social and physical space, most notably in relation
to crime.256 At least in the immediate aftermath, this raised Houston’s
homicide rate as a direct result of the influx of New Orleans gangs
following Hurricane Katrina.257 Above all, questions continue even now
to swirl about the viability of rebuilding the city at all and if so, whether
it should be a smaller city and what impact that has on poverty; charges
of racism abound.258 In a twist that brought together the entire cycle of
property production, Hurricane Katrina badly damaged the oil rigs that
supply the bulk of America’s domestic oil production, badly impairing
the flow of the very fossil fuels burned to power the SUVs and energy-

250. New Orleans: One Year On, ECONOMIST, Aug. 26, 2006, at 23.
251. Id.
252. For an excellent analysis of the tension between liberty and regulation in the
context of poverty both pre- and post-Katrina, see Singer, supra note 143, at 270–73, and
see also The Mississippi Delta: Renaissance Deferred, ECONOMIST, May 13, 2006, at 35,
which describes the difficulties of rebuilding New Orleans, especially for those living in
poverty.
253. See New Orleans: Beyond the Razor-wire, ECONOMIST, June 17, 2006, at 36;
New Orleans: One Year On, supra note 250, at 24.
254. New Orleans’s Slow Recovery: The Long Road Home, ECONOMIST, Mar. 17, 2007,
at 37.
255. Katrina Evacuees in Texas: A Cooling Welcome, ECONOMIST, Sept. 16, 2006,
at 41.
256. Id.
257. Katrina Evacuees in Texas: A Cooling Welcome, supra note 255, at 41;
Amanda Ripley, What Happened to the Gangs of New Orleans?, May 22, 2006, TIME, at
57, 59.
258. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., NEW ORLEANS FIVE YEARS AFTER THE
STORM: A NEW DISASTER AMID RECOVERY 18 (2010), available at http://kaiserfamily
foundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/8089.pdf; New Orleans: The Big Not-Quite-SoEasy, ECONOMIST, Jan. 21, 2006, at 32–33.
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inefficient buildings that cause carbon emissions and greenhouse gases,
which produce the global warming that causes severe weather, including
Hurricane Katrina.259 Of course, the rigs have been repaired, the oil is
flowing once again, and the SUVs are still being mass-produced.260
The causes and consequences of Hurricane Katrina demonstrate the
interwoven complexity to and inseparability and interdependence of
property.261 The operation of formal, legally recognized property rights
at the intimate level—the human person and household energy consumption
producing carbon emissions—at the local level—the use of automobiles
or public places and buildings that emit greenhouse gases or use
energy—and at the regional level—the power generation necessary to
supply homes and industry—causes global warming that affects each of
those communities and similar communities in other places,262 resulting
in the restructuring and reproduction of formal and informal property
rights in both spatialities, which begins the cycle again. Although longterm changes to formal property rights in New Orleans remain to be
seen, this much is true: with global warming worsening, there will be an
increase in severe weather events, which will come with more frequent
short-term changes to social and spatial contexts at every level, in turn
producing the very sort of spatial injustice that we saw both prior to and
following Hurricane Katrina. This will affect the shape and exercise of
formal property rights within social relationships—historicality and
sociality—that may over time produce long-term and permanent changes
to those rights, establishing new variants of formal, legally recognized
property rights and acting as the catalyst for the emergence of informal
property rights, which will in turn produce and reproduce the spatial
context in which we live, which will lead to various forms of spatial

259. See Ulrike Dauer, In Katrina’s Wake: Oil Rig Insurers Expect Price Jumps—
Premiums Could Rise 50% Following Damages in Gulf to at Least 58 Installations,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 2005, at A15; Hurricane Katrina: After the Flood, supra note 248,
at 27; Penance for Gas Guzzlers, N.Y. POST, Feb. 27, 2007, at 6; SUV Pollution Fought,
CINCINNATI POST, May 20, 2000; Gulf of Mexico Fact Sheet, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
http://www.eia.gov/special/gulf_of_mexico/ (last visited July 10, 2013); Santa Fe Wants
‘Green’ Government Buildings, ASSOCIATED PRESS ALERT N.M., June 8, 2006, available
at WL NM 15:56:53.
260. Port Fourchon More than Ready, as Rigs Finally Return, WORLD OIL ONLINE
(Apr. 2012), http://www.worldoil.com/April-2012-Port-Fourchon-more-than-ready-asrigs-finally-return.html.
261. See supra Figure 3.
262. Aminzadeh, supra note 244, at 231.
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injustice. And the contexts identified in this Part, although indicative of
the various fields of human endeavor—intimate, local, regional, and
global—that we may find, the specific examples are by no means
exhaustive of the sorts of spatial context and spatial injustice that we may
find in the world around us. Rather, the very point of identifying the
interwoven complexity to and inseparability and interdependence of
property means that the possible manifestations of produced space and
the injustice that may be present there are infinite.
V. CONCLUSION
Property theorists tell us that property is an undeniable part of human
life. Yet, in explaining that undeniability, those same theorists work
with only property rights and their social origin or what this Article calls
the historicality-sociality binary of property. This Article argues, however,
that we see the centrality of property to human life most forcefully when
we look at place—the space where property happens, where it exists,
and where it operates. There we see how property shapes and structures
the physical and the social space in which we live and how those spatialities
shape and structure property. This Article demonstrates that the property
rights-social origin binary can be broken open through the injection of
spatial thinking, without losing anything of the debate about what property
is. It merely requires a restructuring or reassembly of what we already
know about property. Such a project shows that property contains
the same elements that urban sociologists and planning theorists tell us
are central to an ontology of human life: historicality which, in the case
of property, is rights, their formal legal recognition and protection, the
limitation of their self-seekingness, and their allocation; sociality, or the
social origins of rights, their legal protection, recognition, regulation,
allocation, and the socially contingent nature of boundaries between
them; and spatiality, or the realm of the physical space to which rights
apply and the social space constituted by the constellation of all social
relationships. This is the property trialectic.
The examples presented in the latter half of this Article show us that
once we break open the historicality-sociality binary in property theory
and identify the three constituent elements of the property trialectic, we
locate the interwoven complexity to and inseparability and interdependence
of property and reveal what property actually is in the real world, in the
lives of people. There is no way to understand this unless we take the
three elements together. We see that this happens intracommunity—
intimate, local, regional, and global—and intercommunity. In every way,
through this reassembly, we see that property structures all that we do.
It is truly an undeniable part of human life.
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Above all though, this reassembly is no arid academic exercise—it is
important to see property this way because it captures the totality of
human existence, allowing us to see how property plays a role in being
human. It is important because if property involves ensuring justice for
people,263 then we must see that concept in its totality, as something that
must be done both socially and spatially. Property must, in other words,
do its part to ensure spatial justice along with social justice; indeed, that
is the very point of the ontological trialectic, and it is the point of
reassembling what we already know about property in the same way.
Emphasizing the role of property in the spatial dimension of human life
allows us to identify instances of spatial injustice wrought by property,
pointing the way to where justice, spatial justice, needs to be done in
ways ranging from the intimate to the global.
Current theorizing about property, by omitting explicit reference to
spatiality, cannot capture the ways in which property may be failing to
foster spatial justice and may, in fact, be doing precisely the opposite—
creating spatial injustice, as we have seen in intimate settings, such as
the human person and the home, to local and national contexts, such as
Ukraine and Los Angeles, to the global context in the case of global
climate change. Hurricane Katrina, for instance, showed us
what it means to be poor. We saw people out of options; we saw people who
were desperate; we saw people left behind; we saw people begging for help.
We saw people who lost their lives. We saw the human beings behind the
abstractions. We saw what happens when we push people off the national
agenda.264

In short, what we saw was spatial injustice stemming from the reality
of large disparities of income and wealth distribution, bearing consequences
within the spatiality of the real world. Hurricane Katrina brought together
in one moment the role of property in the four communities—the intimate,
the local, the regional, and the global—revealing spatial injustice, both
before and after the storm. Studying the background and consequences
of Hurricane Katrina reveals how recognizing the spatial dimension

263. Much of contemporary property theory is directed at achieving justice. For a
full canvassing of theorizing about the justice of property, see HARRIS, supra note 2, at
165–369. Harris concludes that “[p]roperty is [j]ust, to a [d]egree, [s]ometimes.” Id. at
362.
264. Singer, supra note 143, at 245.
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would have uncovered the spatial injustice produced by property and might
have stimulated efforts at spatial justice before the storm and the floods.
And above all, it is necessary to move beyond our focus on the
historical-social binary of rights and their social origins in property
theory to offer legislatures, policymakers, and courts an accurate—as
opposed to theoretical—picture of what is happening not only in physical
space but also in social space. If we want government to become more
proactively involved in correcting such problems, then we must be
willing to accept that it must use law to reshape property’s role in the
production of social and physical space to produce more socially
beneficial outcomes. For New Orleans this would have meant looking at
the totality of property to prevent the poverty that was there before
Katrina ever struck and after, to ensure that a host of social ills,
especially poverty, did not reestablish themselves. For other people in
other places such as Ukraine, Los Angeles, and regional communities
the world over, it means learning from New Orleans. But we can only
see the ways that property needs to be reshaped if we can see the way it
works in the world, which means looking at its totality, which means
looking at it trialectically. Only then can we see how property shapes
physical and social space, how it produces injustice, and how that spatial
and social reality in turn shapes property in an ongoing cycle. Only then
can property be reshaped to combat “the problems of race, class, gender,
and all forms of oppression, subjugation, and exploitation.”265

265.
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Soja, supra note 28, at 1429.

